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A PROPOSED MINIMUM THRESHOLD ANALYSIS FOR THE
IMPOSITION OF STATE DOOR-CLOSING STATUTES
INTRODUCTION

"Door-closing" statutes bar a corporate plaintiff from pursuing an
action based on an intrastate claim in a state's courts if the corporation
has been conducting intrastate business in that state without having
qualified to do so. ' Their purpose is to encourage foreign corporations
to qualify to conduct intrastate business2 and to pay the state taxes
1. As of 1981, all fifty states, as well as the District of Columbia, had statutes
that precluded a foreign corporation from bringing an action in their courts under
these circumstances. Corp. Guide (P-H) 7103, 7106 (1981): see, e.g., Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 607.354(1) (West 1977): Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271A.610 (Baldwin 1981):
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1312(a) (McKinney 1963); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 117
(1960). See generally Note, Sanctionsfor Failureto Comply with Corporate Qualification Statutes: An Evaluation, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 117 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Qualification Statutes]. Door-closing statutes are raised as a defense to a suit by a
foreign corporation. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 24 (1974):
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 277 (1961). These statutes
generally do not restrict the right of an unqualified corporation to defend lawsuits.
E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.125 (Smith-Hurd 1954 & Supp. 1982-1983): N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 14A:13-11(2) (West 1969); Va. Code § 13.1-119 (1978 & Supp. 1982);
see Model Bus. Corp. Act § 117 (1960). But see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 80.210(1) (1979)
(unqualified foreign corporation barred from defending action in state court), Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 180.847(1) (West 1957 & Supp. 1982-1983) (same). Both the Nevada and
the Wisconsin statutes, however, have been liberally construed to permit unqualified
foreign corporations to defend suits in state courts. See Walker Bank & Trust Co. v.
Smith, 88 Nev. 502, 507, 501 P.2d 639, 642 (1972) (plaintiff estopped from asserting
Nevada's door-closing statute to prevent unqualified foreign corporation from asserting a defense); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 52 Wis. 2d 325, 341, 190 N.W.2d 521, 529
(1971) (Wisconsin's door-closing statute construed to prevent only an affirmative
recovery). An unqualified foreign corporation is generally permitted to assert a
counterclaim if it arises out of the same transaction as the claim that it is defending.
See Environmental Coatings, Inc. v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Co., 617 F.2d 110,
112 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Aberle Hosiery Co. v. American Arbitration Ass'n,
337 F. Supp. 90, 92 (E.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed per curiam, 461 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir.
1972); National Bank v. J.B.L. & K. of Alaska, Inc., 546 P.2d 579, 589 (Alaska
1976). In many jurisdictions, the bar to filing suit may be removed by qualifying to
do business at any time before filing. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.354 (West
1977); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.125 (Smith-Hurd 1954 & Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y.
Bus. Corp. Law § 1312(a) (McKinney 1963). But see Ala. Code § 10-2A-247 (1980)
(contract made by unqualified foreign corporation is void at the action of such
corporation); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-1202 (1980) (same); Miss. Code Ann. § 79-3-247
(1972) (same); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 2120a (1973) (foreign corporation's claim
barred if corporation was unqualified at time of contract).
2. Qualifying to do business typically includes appointing an agent for the
service of process and registering with the secretary of state so that taxes may be
assessed and collected. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.317(1)(j) (West 1977) (tax
assessment); id. § 607.327(1)(e) (service of process); Miss. Code Ann. § 79-3-219(1)
(1972) (tax assessment); id. § 79-3-229 (service of process); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §
1304(a)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (service of process); id. § 1304(a)(8) (tax
assessment).
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levied on that intrastate business.3 Access to court cannot be barred,
however, if a plaintiff is litigating an interstate claim, such as a suit to
enforce a contract for interstate or foreign commerce. 4 Such a bar
would impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce and
therefore violate the commerce clause. 5
Application of these statutes does not run afoul of the commerce
clause, however, if the plaintiff is engaged in intrastate commerce,
and the claim emanates from this intrastate business6 rather than from
interstate or foreign commerce. 7 Thus, a corporation engaged in intrastate business cannot "escape state regulation merely because it is
also engaged in interstate commerce." 8 For example, if an Indiana
3. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 40 n.6 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), Comment, Foreign Corporations-StateBoundariesfor National Business, 59 Yale L.J. 737, 746 (1950). Door-closing statutes serve as penalties to foreign
corporations that do not comply with statutory qualification procedures. See, e.g.,
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.354 (West 1977); Miss. Code Ann. § 79-3-247 (1972); N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 1312(a) (McKinney 1963). The procedures ensure that the states will be
able to assess and collect taxes on the intrastate business conducted by foreign
corporations. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 40 n.6 (1974)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). States are permitted to so regulate intrastate business. See
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 279 (1961); Union Brokerage
Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 210-12 (1944); Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 282
U.S. 440, 443-44 (1931).
4. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 34 (1974); Sioux Remedy Co.
v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1914); Diversacon Indus. v. National Bank of Commerce, 629 F.2d 1030, 1033 (5th Cir. 1980); Silver v. Woolf, 538 F. Supp. 881, 886
(D. Conn.), aff'd, 694 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1982).
5. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 34 (1974) (state's "'refusal to
honor and enforce contracts made for interstate or foreign commerce is repugnant to
the Commerce Clause"); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282,
291 (1921) ("A corporation of one State may go into another ... for all the legitimate
purposes of such commerce; and any statute of the latter State which obstructs or lays
a burden on the exercise of this privilege is void under the commerce clause."); Jerold
Panas & Partners, Inc. 'v. Portland Soc'y of Art, 535 F. Supp. 650, 652 n.1 (D. Me.
1982) (state statute that burdens interstate commerce of a foreign corporation is
unconstitutional under the commerce clause); Uncle Ben's Inc. v. Crowell, 482 F.
Supp. 1149, 1153-54 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (same).
6. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 277-79 (1961); Union
Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 210-12 (1944); Railway Express Agency v.
Virginia, 282 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1931). When these criteria are met, then the application of a door-closing statute is constitutional because it is merely a mechanism for
enforcing the corporation's tax obligations. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419
U.S. 20, 40 n.6 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1974); Dahnke-Walker
Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 291 (1921); Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235
U.S. 197, 201-02 (1914); Diversacon Indus. v. National Bank of Commerce, 629 F.2d
1030, 1033 (5th Cir. 1980); Silver v. Woolf, 538 F. Supp. 881, 886 (D. Conn.), aff'd,
694 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1982).
8. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 279 (1961), see Union
Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1944); Railway Express Agency v.
Virginia, 282 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1931).
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corporation conducting both interstate and intrastate business in New
Jersey ships its products to New Jersey and later sells them intrastate to
New Jersey customers through its own New Jersey salesmen, New
Jersey's door-closing statute may bar a claim arising out of the intrastate sale.9 It may not, however, bar a claim arising out of the initial
interstate shipment from Indiana. 0
State law currently determines what threshold of activity is required to justify the imposition of a state's door-closing statute. I The
threshold varies depending upon the statute involved and the way that
a court construes it.' 2 In some states, the threshold is rather low;
minimal contacts are deemed sufficiently intrastate in nature to invoke those states' door-closing statutes.' 3 This raises the issue whether
interstate contacts are being used to preclude a corporation from
9. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 278-79 (1961). The
Court noted that the plaintiff was "suing upon a contract entirely separable from any
particular interstate sale and the power of the State [was] not limited." Id. at 282-83.
10. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 32-34 (1974); DahnkeWalker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 291-92 (1921); Sioux Remedy Co. v.
Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1914).
11. The threshold inquiry usually takes the form of defining how much activity
within the state is equal to transacting business within the meaning of the state
statutes. See, e.g., S. & L. Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Vickers, 267 Ark. 109, 11011, 589 S.W.2d 196, 196-97 (1979); Integrated Container Servs. v. Overstreet, 375
So. 2d 1146, 1149-50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Aeropesca Ltd. v. Butler Aviation
Int'l, Inc., 44 Md. App. 610, 618-19, 411 A.2d 1055, 1060-61 (1980). Federal courts
sitting in diversity also follow such state law. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying
text. A state may not, however, determine that a foreign corporation is conducting
business within the state for the purpose of applying its door-closing statute if the
corporation is conducting only interstate business in the state. Allenberg Cotton Co.
v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 33 (1974); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S.
276, 283-84 (1961).
12. CompareSar Mfg. v. Dumas Bros. Mfg., 526 F.2d 1283, 1285 (5th Cir. 1976)
("[S]everal Alabama cases have held that the mere acceptance of a contract sued on
in Alabama is sufficient to require the plaintiff to meet the qualification requirements of the statutes.") and Uncle Ben's Inc. v. Crowell, 482 F. Supp. 1149, 1152-53
(E.D. Ark. 1980) (holding, under Arkansas law, the mere presence of two employees
within the state, even in the absence of an office and a telephone, was considered
sufficient contact to trigger the statute) with United Merchants & Mfrs. v. David &
Dash, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (D. Md. 1977) (maintenance of an office and a
business telephone were not sufficient contacts to justify imposition of Maryland's
door-closing statute) and Stafford-Higgins Indus. v. Gaytone Fabrics, Inc., 300 F.
Supp. 65, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (under New York law, a continuity of intrastate
business purpose and activity is required to trigger New York's door-closing statute).
For examples of state court determinations, see supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., Sar Mfg. v. Dumas Bros. Mfg., 526 F.2d 1283, 1285 (5th Cir. 1976)
(under Alabama law, the mere acceptance of a contract deemed sufficient contact);
McCollum Aviation, Inc. v. Cim Assocs., 438 F. Supp. 245, 250 (S.D. Fla. 1977)
(under Florida law, any intrastate contact deemed sufficient contact); S. & L.
Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Vickers, 267 Ark. 109, 110-11, 589 S.W.2d 196, 196-97
(1979) (in Arkansas, an intrastate contract made by an unqualified foreign corporation deemed to be void ab initio).
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access to a state forum, thus impermissibly burdening interstate commerce. To ensure that these statutes will not be applied unconstitutionally, and that corporations may accurately predict their rights and
obligations, a uniform minimum standard should be adopted. This
Note suggests that the minimum contacts analysis used to determine
whether a state may subject a defendant to its jurisdiction14 is appropriate to determine what threshold must be crossed before a corporation is deemed engaged in intrastate commerce for the purpose of
applying state door-closing statutes.
Part I of this Note discusses the Supreme Court's guidelines for
determining when a state may tax interstate commerce. It further
discusses the fact that the Court has declined to provide similar guidelines regarding the threshold of contacts that must be met before a
state may constitutionally apply a door-closing statute on the ground
that a corporation is engaged in intrastate commerce. Part II analyzes
the need for a uniform minimum threshold that can be applied by all
courts. Finally, Part III of this Note suggests that the prevailing
minimum contacts analysis for personal jurisdiction should be
adopted for this purpose.
I.

UNREASONABLE STATE TAXATION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

The Supreme Court has provided guidance on the relationship that
a state must have with a corporation before it may impose a tax on

that corporation's income from interstate commerce conducted within
the state. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,'5 the Supreme
Court unanimously held that a state may not tax the interstate com-

merce conducted by a foreign corporation unless the corporation has a

14. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Supreme
Court stated that in order for a state to subject a defendant to in personam jurisdiction, the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the state. Id. at 316.
The Court refined the test in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), holding that a
defendant is subject to a state's jurisdiction only if it "purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." Id. at 253. The purposefulness of a defendant's activities in the forum state has been, and continues to be, a
dominant inquiry in the Court's in personam jurisdictional analysis. Chronologically,
these cases include: Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215-16 (1977) (extension of
"purposeful availment" standard to quasi in rem action); Kulko v. Superior Court,
436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) ("A father who agrees . . . to allow [his children] to spend
more time in California than was required under a separation agreement can hardly
be said to have 'purposefully availed himself' of the 'benefits and protections' of
California's laws.") (citing Shaffer); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) ("[Petitioners] avail themselves of none of the privileges and
benefits of Oklahoma law."); cf. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2104 n.10 (1982) (reiterating need for minimum contacts
analysis and citing "individual['s] liberty interest" as justification for restraint on
forum's sovereign power resulting from deployment of the analysis).
15. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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substantial nexus with the state and the tax is fairly related to the
services provided the state. 16 The Court added, in Commonwealth
Edison v. Montana,'7 that "when the measure of a tax bears no
relationship to the taxpayers' presence or activities in a State, a court
may properly conclude under ... the Complete Auto Transit test that
the State is imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce."",
The standards set forth in Complete Auto Transit and its progeny
do not, however, serve as a satisfactory threshold of contact that state
courts should be required to find before invoking their door-closing
statutes. Complete Auto Transit involved state sales taxes related to
the use of state facilities by foreign corporations engaging in interstate
commerce. 9 Such taxes may be imposed in accordance with the corporation's use of state services because "interstate commerce may be
made to pay its way."' 20 Conversely, door-closing statutes enforce state
franchise taxes levied on a foreign corporation engaging in intrastate
business activities. 21 Such franchise taxes are gauged not according to
the corporation's use of state services but rather are based upon the
amount of corporate assets present in the state. 22
When a state court invokes a door-closing statute because it has
determined that the foreign corporation has conducted sufficient activity to constitute intrastate business for the purpose of applying its
statute, it has in effect determined that the foreign corporation should
be liable for taxes because of its conduct in the state. 23 Such a determination will impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce,
however, if interstate activities are unjustifiably labeled as intrastate
to bring a corporation within a state's power to tax.2 4
For example, a determination by a Mississippi court that a Tennessee corporation has engaged in intrastate business and was thus subject
to Mississippi's door-closing statute would place an impermissible bur16. Id. at 279, 287-89.
17. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
18. Id. at 629.
19. 430 U.S. at 275-79.
20. Id. at 281.
21. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
22. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 40 n.6 (1974) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.367(2)-(4) (West 1977); Miss. Code
Ann. § 27-13-7(1) (Supp. 1982); N.Y. Tax Law § 209(1) (MeKinney Supp. 19821983).
23. By invoking a door-closing statute, a state court is imposing a statutory
penalty because a foreign corporation has been doing business within the terms of the
statute but has not qualified to do so. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.354(1) (West
1977); Miss. Code Ann. § 79-3-247 (1972); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1312(a) (McKinney 1963). The statutes are designed to encourage foreign corporations to meet the
tax liability resulting from their intrastate transactions. See supra notes 1-3 and
accompanying text.
24. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
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den on interstate commerce if, in fact, the corporation did not have
sufficient contacts with Mississippi to justify the imposition of a tax on
the revenues generated by the corporation's business. 25 Such was the
situation in Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittnan,26 in which the Supreme
Court held that the appellant foreign corporation did not have the
27
intrastate contacts required for Mississippi to bar it from state court.
The Court expressly declined to decide whether the corporation had
the proper nexus with state services to render its interstate contacts
liable to a local tax on those services. 2 The foreign corporation's
contacts with Mississippi were simply deemed to be "interstate," and
the Court refused to enforce the door-closing statute. 29 Rather than
establishing a minimum intrastate contacts threshold at which state
taxation of intrastate business revenue, as enforced by door-closing
statutes, was constitutionally permissible, the Court declined to address the issue. 30 Thus, the need for a minimum threshold at which to
judge intrastate contacts for the purpose of applying state door-closing
statutes remains.
II. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM MINIMUM THRESHOLD
State law presently determines the threshold of contacts that is
sufficient to trigger a state's door-closing statute. 3' Because courts
differ significantly in their determinations, little uniformity in the
application of these statutes exists. 32 For example, Alabama courts
have held that the mere sale by a foreign corporation to an Alabama
customer constitutes sufficient contact with the state for the doorclosing statute to apply, 33 while New York courts have held that in
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 33 (1974).
419 U.S. 20 (1974).
Id. at 33-34.
Id.

29. Id. at 32-34.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Boles v. Midland Guardian Co., 410 So. 2d 82, 84 (Ala. Civ. App.
1982) (a single sale in Alabama is all that is required to invoke the statute); S. & L.
Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Vickers, 267 Ark. 109, 109-10, 589 S.W.2d 196, 196-97
(1979) (a single intrastate contract sufficient to invoke statute); Integrated Container
Servs. v. Overstreet, 375 So. 2d 1146, 1149-50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (repairing
and storing marine containers located in state sufficient to invoke statute); Aeropesca
Ltd. v. Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc., 44 Md. App. 610, 618-19, 411 A.2d 1055, 1060-61
(1980) (contracting with a Maryland concern not sufficient to invoke statute); Gruman v. Plotkin, 61 A.D.2d 1024, 1024-25, 403 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (1978) (per curiam)
(statute inapplicable if corporation not "doing business" within the state).
32. See supra notes 12, 31.
33. E.g., Sar Mfg. v. Dumas Bros. Mfg., 526 F.2d 1283, 1285 (5th Cir. 1976)
(applying Alabama law); Boles v. Midland Guardian Co., 410 So. 2d 82, 84 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1982). But see Kentucky Galvanizing Co. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
335 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 1976) (mere solicitation not enough to invoke door-closing
statute).
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order for New York's statute to be invoked, "the foreign corporation
must do more than make a single contract, engage in an isolated piece
of business, or an occasional undertaking; it must maintain
and carry
34
on business with some continuity of act and purpose.
This lack of uniformity creates uncertainty for a foreign corporation. 35 A door-closing statute presents the corporation with the di-

lemma of either qualifying to do business in the state, and hence
subjecting itself to state fees and taxes, or running the risk that it will
be unable to sue in state court if its contacts are deemed sufficient to
invoke the statute. A corporation may thus be deterred from conducting business in certain states because of its fear that courts of those
states might deem the corporation to have the requisite intrastate
contacts to bar it from those courts. 36 In addition, an adjudication by
one state's courts that a corporation is engaged in intrastate commerce
for the purpose of applying the state door-closing statute may deter
that corporation from engaging in those same activities in another
state because it wishes to avoid a similar
result, even though the other
37
state may judge the issue differently.
The purpose of the commerce clause is to foster the free flow of
commerce and to encourage commercial uniformity among the
states. 3 The Supreme Court has held that "a state may not impose a
34. Stafford-Higgins Indus. v. Gaytone Fabrics, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 65, 66
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (applying New York law and quoting International Fuel & Iron
Corp. v. Donner Steel Co., 242 N.Y. 224, 230, 151 N.E. 214, 215 (1926)); accord
Gruman v. Plotkin, 61 A.D.2d 1024, 1024-25, 403 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (1978) (per
curiam).
35. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
36. For state adjudications that a foreign corporation's contacts with the state
were sufficient to invoke a door-closing statute, see Boles v. Midland Guardian Co.,
410 So. 2d 82, 84 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); S. & L. Painting Contractors, Inc. v.
Vickers, 267 Ark. 109, 109-10, 589 S.W.2d 196, 196-97 (1979); Integrated Container
Servs. v. Overstreet, 375 So. 2d 1146, 1149-50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Aeropesca
Ltd. v. Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc., 44 Md. App. 610, 618-19, 411 A.2d 1055, 1060-61
(1980); Gruman v. Plotkin, 61 A.D.2d 1024, 1024-25, 403 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (1978)
(per curiam).
37. For example, isolated actions by a foreign corporation that would not bar it
from New York's courts would likely bar it from Alabama's courts. Compare Sar
Mfg. v. Dumas Bros. Mfg., 526 F.2d 1283, 1285 (5th Cir. 1976) (single sale sufficient
to trigger Alabama's door-closing statute) with Stafford-Higgins Indus. v. Gaytone
Fabrics, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 65, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (continuity of business purpose
required for New York's door-closing statute to apply).
38. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350
(1977) ("Commerce Clause's overriding requirement [is to effect] a national 'common
market.' "). In H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), the Court
stated:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and
every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will
have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will
withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regula-
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burden which materially affects interstate commerce in an area where
uniformity of regulation is necessary." ' 39 State legislation regulating

the length of trains, 40 the length and width of trucks, 41 and the type of

safety equipment required on trucks42 has been held to violate the
commerce clause because the lack of national uniformity resulting
from such legislation had a deleterious effect upon interstate commerce which outweighed the state's interest in promulgating the regulations.
In determining whether the burden that a state places upon interstate commerce is permissible, the Court has stated that "the question
is whether the state interest is outweighed by a national interest in the
unhampered operation of interstate commerce. ' 43 The Court has generally upheld state statutes that imposed a burden on interstate commerce if they were promulgated to protect the health and safety of a
state's citizens. 44 Such is not the purpose of door-closing statutes,
however, which are designed to protect primarily economic interests. 45 If a state statute burdens interstate commerce, then the extent
of the burden that will be constitutionally tolerated depends not only
upon the nature of the state interest promoted by the statute, but also
upon "whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities. '

46

The establishment of a uniform minimum

threshold for determining when a state door-closing statute may be
invoked would preserve a state's interest in regulating local business
activities while removing the negative impact that states may currently impose upon interstate commerce.
tions exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine
of this Court which has given it reality.
Id. at 539; see Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935) (state statute
that presents an "unreasonable clog upon the mobility of commerce" is "hostile in
conception as well as burdensome in result" and hence repugnant to the commerce
clause).
39. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 444-45 (1960)
(pollution ordinance upheld in order to protect health of local community).
40. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781-82 (1945).
41. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978). But see
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1938)
(state statute upheld in absence of congressional legislation).
42. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 526-29 (1959).
43. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949); accord United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Local 334, United Ass'n of Journeymen, 452 U.S. 615, 637 n.11 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 44243 (1960) (pollution ordinance); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938) (highway safety statute); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S.
346, 349-50 (1933) (cattle quarantine statute).
45. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
46. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); accord Lewis v. BT
Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36-37 (1980).
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The need for uniformity is not restricted to state court adjudications. Federal courts sitting in diversity currently look to state case law
to determine whether a foreign corporation has been transacting intrastate business for the purpose of applying state door-closing statutes. 47 The Supreme Court expressly sanctioned this practice in Woods
v. InterstateRealty Co.,48 in which the Court reasoned that the Eric
Railroadv. Tompkins 49 policy of following state law in diversity cases
was applicable to door-closing statutes. 0 The Woods holding appears
to conflict with the Court's decision in Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson
Electric Co., 5 1 in which it stated that the Erie policy was inapplicable
"to those areas of judicial decision within which the policy of the law
is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations
which they affect must be deemed governed by federal law having its
source in those statutes, rather than by local law."5 2 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has set forth guidelines as to what constitutes intrastate, as opposed to interstate commerce. 53 Furthermore, the Second
Circuit has stated that the application of door-closing statutes "so as to
frustrate the petitioner's access to a federal forum to litigate an admittedly federal matter and thereby limit the uniform and effective
application of a federal .. .statute is a result not contemplated by
Erie." 54 Federal courts sitting in diversity should therefore apply a
uniform minimum contacts analysis to determine whether a corporation has been conducting intrastate business for the purposes of applying a state door-closing statute.
III.

IMPORTING A UNIFORM MINIMUM THRESHOLD
FROM PERSONAL JURISDICTION ANALYSIS

A. The Existing Definition of Intrastate Commerce
The Supreme Court has set forth some general guidelines as to what
constitutes intrastate business so that states may tax and regulate such
47. See, e.g., Uncle Ben's, Inc. v. Crowell, 482 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (E.D. Ark.
1980); United Merchants & Mfrs. v. David & Dash, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1078, 1087
(D. Md. 1977); McCollum Aviation, Inc. v. Cim Assocs., 438 F. Supp. 245, 249-50
(S.D. Fla. 1977); Stafford-Higgins Indus. v. Gaytone Fabrics, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 65,
66 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
48. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
49. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
50. 337 U.S. at 536-37 (Erie intended to eliminate discrimination "infavor of
those authorized to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts").
51. 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
52. Id. at 176 (applicability of patent laws and Sherman Antitrust Act).
53. Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 153-57 (1918); see Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 280-82 (1961). See infra notes 55-59 and
accompanying text.
54. Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 550 F.2d 1320,
1326 (2d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted); accord Ayer v. General Dynamics Corp., 82
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business without burdening interstate commerce. 55 The maintenance
of a local office for the purpose of buying, selling or repairing goods
has been held to constitute intrastate business, which is subject to state
taxation and regulation.5 6 Likewise, maintaining a local office in
which to conduct corporate meetings and distribute assets and dividends constitutes intrastate commerce.5 7 On the other hand, the maintenance of a local office merely to facilitate the solicitation of orders
for goods shipped from out of state does not constitute intrastate
commerce for the purpose of state taxation. 5 8 Similarly, a contract
made and executed entirely within one state may constitute an interstate transaction if the subject matter of the transaction is intended for
interstate shipment.5 9 There remains a need for specific guidelines to
determine when a state's door-closing statute may constitutionally be
applied.
B. A Uniform Minimum Threshold is Required
The determination of the threshold of contact required to trigger a
door-closing statute is currently determined by state law.6 0 The application of such statutes based upon a foreign corporation's interstate
contacts violates the commerce clause. 6' Elimination of this impermissible burden on interstate commerce requires a uniform minimum
threshold at which contacts become sufficient to permit the application of a state's door-closing statute. Moreover, elimination of this
burden would also have the salutory effect of permitting corporations
to formulate a uniform national business policy. 62 An appropriate test
may be imported from the due process principles defining the minimum contacts that a defendant must have with a state before the state
may assert its jurisdiction over him. 63 These principles apply equally
well to determine the constitutionality of a state's assertion of its
F.R.D. 115, 119 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see Jerold Panas & Partners, Inc. v. Portland
Soc'v of Art, 535 F. Supp. 650, 652 n.1 (D. Me. 1982).
55. See Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 153-57 (1918).
56. Id. at 154-55.
57. Id. at 155-56.
58. Id. at 153-54; see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 28083 (1961) (presence of an office and 18 employees who promoted intrastate sale of
foreign corporation's products held to constitute intrastate commerce for purpose of
applying state door-closing statute).
59. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 292 (1921) (contract made in Kentucky for shipment of grain to Tennessee deemed interstate); see
Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 30 (1974) ("Delivery of the cotton to a
warehouse, taken in isolation, is an intrastate transaction. But that delivery is also
essential for the completion of the interstate transaction.").
60. See supra note 11.
61. See supra note 4.
62. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 14.
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power to tax in this context, and its power to punish by denying a
plaintiff a forum in which to litigate its claims.
C. The Proposed Standard
The Supreme Court has held that a state court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who lacks certain "minimum contacts"
with the forum state is inconsistent with the due process clause of the
Constitution. 64 State courts must therefore look to constitutional principles of due process to determine whether they may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant. 65 The Supreme Court set forth the "minimum
contacts" test in InternationalShoe v. Washington,66 stating that "to
the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the
laws of that6 7state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to
obligations.
It is the obligations generated by the transaction of intrastate business-registering and paying taxes-that door-closing statutes seek to
enforce by mandating that a foreign corporation fulfill those obligations in order to enjoy a state court's protection.6 8 Under the International Shoe test, a defendant, if not present within a state, must "have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "69 Similarly, a minimum intrastate contacts analysis would
allow a state court to apply its door-closing statute fairly to a given
fact situation without violating the commerce clause. 70 The Court has
stated that "the fairness standard of International Shoe can be easily
applied in the vast majority of cases." ' 71 A principal advantage of using
the International Shoe test for intrastate contacts analysis is that it
provides uniformity within a flexible framework. Like the jurisdictional determination, the intrastate threshold determination is "one in
64. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (minimum
contacts by defendant necessary for exercise of in personam jurisdiction to comport
with due process); see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (applying the
same standards for in personam and quasi in rem jurisdiction).
65. See, e.g., 500 Motors, Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 827, 832, 176
Cal. Rptr. 349, 352 (1981); Ballard v. Rawlins, Inc., 101 Ill. App. 3d 601, 605, 428
N.E.2d 532, 535-36 (1981); Gager v. White, 53 N.Y.2d 475, 482, 425 N.E.2d 851,
853, 442 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981).
66. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
67. Id. at 319.
68. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
69. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
70. For examples of how door-closing statutes have been applied to fact situations so as not to burden interstate commerce, see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs,
Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961); Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944);
Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931).
71. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977).
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which few answers will be written 'in black and white. The greys are
dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable.' "72
Three interrelated concerns are addressed when applying the minimum contacts fairness standard. One concern is whether the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of state law. 73 This
requirement allows the corporation to plan its activities and eliminates uncertainty as to whether a door-closing statute may properly be
invoked. If a foreign corporation has purposefully availed itself of
state law by conducting a pattern of intrastate business, it may reasonably expect that it must qualify to do such business or be denied access
to that state's courts.7 4 The actual filing of the lawsuit which gives rise
to a state's attempt to invoke its door-closing statute does not constitute purposeful availment, however, because door-closing statutes bar

a plaintiff from bringing an action if the plaintiff was not qualified to
do business at the time that the cause of action arose.75 Consequently,
any purposeful availment after the cause of action arises, such as the
filing of the lawsuit, cannot constitute purposeful availment for the
purpose of minimum threshold analysis.
The forseeability that a defendant's contacts with the forum will
render it amenable to suit must also be analyzed. Jurisdiction may not
be imposed on a defendant unless "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there. '7 6 This test also should be
used to determine whether a state's door-closing statute should apply.
If a foreign corporation could reasonably anticipate being sued in that
state, then it should be precluded from suing unless it meets the state's

72. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334
U.S. 541, 545 (1948)).
73. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see Insurance Corp. of Ir. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2104 n.10 (1982); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Noel v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
669 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (6th Cir. 1982); Santiago v. BRS, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 755,
757-59 (D.P.R. 1981)
74. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 33 (1974) (foreign corporation's "contacts with Mississippi [did] not exhibit the sort of localization or intrastate character which [the Court has] required in situations where a State seeks to
require a foreign corporation to qualify to do business"); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-OnDrugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 280 (1961) (Court agreed with trial court's determination
that foreign corporation was transacting intrastate business, stating that "[t]o hold
...that plaintiff [Lilly] is not doing business in New Jersey is to completely ignore
reality.") (citation omitted).
75. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12:302(A) (West Supp. 1983) (maintaining
action in Louisiana court does not constitute doing business in Louisiana for purpose
of applying Lousiana's door-closing statute); Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. § 7103(1) (1975) (bringing action in Maryland court does not constitute intrastate business in Maryland).
76. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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qualification requirements. 7 7 The forseeability analysis is useful because it allows corporations to formulate national business policy
based upon uniformity. 78 It would help to remove the burden on
interstate commerce presently imposed by the uncertainty engendered
by the lack of a uniform minimum intrastate contacts threshold.7
Another consideration of minimum contacts is "the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." 8 0 This also aids
in the intrastate contacts analysis because the forum state's interest lies
in the proper application of its door-closing statute. The statutes are
designed to encourage foreign corporations to qualify properly before
availing themselves of the benefits of state law. 8 ' Indeed, the relationship between a foreign corporation and the forum state must be
analyzed to determine if the corporation has been conducting intrastate business in the forum state.12 In addition, the relationship between the litigation and the foreign corporation determines the nature
of the corporation's contacts with the forum state. 3 For example, a
door-closing statute may not constitutionally bar a foreign corporation
from suing to enforce a contract made for interstate commerce. 4 The
relationship among the foreign corporation, the forum and the litigation is particularly important when a door-closing statute leaves a
foreign corporation without a remedy for an otherwise valid claim. ,5
77. This comports with the purpose of door-closing statutes, which is to encourage foreign corporations to qualify. See supra notes 1, 3.
78. The Supreme Court has stressed the role of the commerce clause in ensuring
the prosperity of the nation by promoting centralized regulations affecting commerce. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949) ("The
necessity of centralized regulation of commerce among the states was obvious and so
full) recognized that the few words of the Commerce Clause were little illuminated
by debate."); see also California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949) ("the familiar test
is that of uniformity"). See supra note 38.
79. See supra notes 12, 31.
80. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977); see McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
81. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 40 n.6 (1974) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
82. For examples of such analyses, see Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S.
20, 33 (1974); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 279-81 (1961);
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 291 (1921).
83. See, e.g., Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1974), Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 282-83 (1961); Sar Mfg. v. Dumas
Bros. Mfg., 526 F.2d 1283, 1285 (5th Cir. 1976); Uncle Ben's, Inc. v. Crowell, 482 F.
Supp. 1149, 1152-53 (E.D. Ark. 1980); United Merchants & Mfrs. v. David & Dash,
Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (D. Md. 1977).
84. See supra note 5.
85. Some door-closing statutes forever bar a plaintiff foreign corporation's claim
if the corporation was unqualified at the time that its cause of action arose. See, e.g.,
Ala. Code § 10-2A-247 (1980); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 64-1201 to -1202 (1980); Miss.
Code Ann. § 79-3-247 (1972). These statutes thus differ significantly from other
statutes that provide a nunc pro tunc curative provision, allowing a foreign corpora-
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In such cases, the plaintiff foreign corporation may be unable to
obtain jurisdiction over the domestic corporation in another state. 6
The plaintiff corporation's contacts with the litigation should therefore by analyzed carefully to prevent a claim from being forever
barred. 7 The flexibility afforded by the relationship analysis of the
minimum contacts test is quite appropriate to these situations.
CONCLUSION

Courts should apply a uniform minimum threshold analysis when
determining whether a foreign corporation has conducted intrastate
business for the purpose of imposing the penalties of a state's doorclosing statute. Such a minimum threshold would remove the burden
to interstate commerce currently posed by states that close their court
doors to foreign corporations engaging solely in interstate business.
Moreover, a uniform minimum threshold would assist corporations in
formulating a uniform business policy. The minimum contacts analysis presented in InternationalShoe and its progeny provides a uniform
yet flexible standard that may appropriately be applied to establish a
uniform minimum intrastate contacts threshold.
William R. Crowe
tion to gain access to state courts if it pays back taxes and the requisite fees and
penalties prescribed in the statute. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.354 (West 1977);
Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-331(b) (1982); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1312 (MeKinney 1963).
It has been suggested that such non-curative statutes may violate the foreign
corporation's due process rights. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20,
41-42 & n.9 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The statutes, however, appear to
withstand a due process attack even though they discriminate against foreign corporations because they bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose (controlling intrastate business activities). Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124
(1978). The Supreme Court has shown a great reluctance to invalidate state economic regulations on the basis of due process. Id. ("It is, by now, absolutely clear
that the Due Process Clause does not empower the judiciary 'to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation.".) (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726, 731 (1963)).
Similarly, the Court has been reluctant to find that state economic regulations
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668, 674 (1981) (no equal protection violation when a
state statute discriminated against foreign corporations because a legitimate state
purpose was furthered by such discrimination); see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461-63, 470 (1981) (no equal protection violation when a
state's interest in promoting conservation discriminated against producers of plastic
milk containers).
86. See Qualification Statutes, supra note 1, at 130 & n.87.
87. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. One district court has suggested
that a greater burden upon interstate commerce should be tolerated when a doorclosing statute does not leave the corporation without a remedy. McCollum Aviation,
Inc. v. Cim Assocs., 438 F. Supp. 245, 251 (S.D. Fla. 1977). Indeed, the analysis set
forth by the McCollun court suggests that flexibility in the application of doorclosing statutes is desirable. Minimum contacts analysis affords such flexibility.

THE RES JUDICATA EFFECT OF PRIOR STATE COURT
JUDGMENTS IN SHERMAN ACT SUITS: EXALTING
SUBSTANCE OVER FORM
INTRODUCTION

The federal courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction' over claims arising under the federal antitrust laws. 2 Because Congress has not preempted 3 state regulation of antitrust violations, 4 however, conduct
1. In those areas of law over which the federal courts have been granted
exclusive jurisdiction, affirmative claims for relief arising under federal statutes may
only be brought in federal court. Note, Exclusive Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts
in Private Civil Actions, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 510 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts];see Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S.
255, 259 (1897). State courts may, however, determine the merits of federal "questions" that are raised "collaterally." Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, supra, at 510;
see American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916);
Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897). For example, a state
court has jurisdiction to consider the defense of illegality under the federal antitrust
laws in a breach of contract action. Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, supra, at 51011; see Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 187-88 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955).
2. E.g., Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 984 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1078 (1980); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 583 F.2d 378, 279 (7th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Cream Top Creamery v.
Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1967); see Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 188 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); see, e.g.,
Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 451 & n.6 (1943); Blumenstock Bros.
Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440-41 (1920). The
federal antitrust statutes do not explicitly provide the federal courts with "exclusive"
jurisdiction. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). The statutes have, however, been judicially construed as
vesting this jurisdiction in the federal courts. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore
Co., 640 F.2d 484, 489 n.11 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); see 18 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4470, at 691 & n.41
(1981) [hereinafter cited as C. Wright & A. Miller]. See infra notes 128-33 and
accompanying text. This omission has led at least one commentator to conclude that
"exclusive jurisdiction was not intended." Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, supra
note 1, at 510 n.13. Congress has expressly granted the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over several other major areas of federal law, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1976) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976) (patent and
copyright law); id. § 1334 (bankruptcy); id. § 1333(1) (admiralty). The res judicata
effect of prior state court judgments in the areas of admiralty and bankruptcy is
beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of exclusive jurisdiction and res
judicata in the SEC, copyright and patent areas, see infra note 90.
3. The issue whether federal legislation is intended to preempt state regulation
is determined by statutory construction. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 623, at 376 (1978). A congressional purpose to oecupy a field of law exclusively may be
inferred only if Congress explicitly provides for this result or if the nature of the
subject matter of the regulation compels this determination. Id. § 6-25, at 384; see
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). If it is
determined that Congress did intend to preempt state law by occupying the field,
then state regulation will be invalidated even if it is in keeping with the federal
policy. L. Tribe, supra, § 6-25, at 384. For a discussion of some areas in which state
law is preempted by federal legislation, see infra note 87.
4. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 495 (1949);
Standard Oil v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413, 422 (1910); Woods Exploration & Produc-
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giving rise to claims under the Sherman Act may also be grounds for
affirmative relief under state antitrust statutes in state court. 5 Given
this concurrent regulation, the issue may arise whether a claim under
section one of the Sherman Act 6 should be barred under the doctrine
of res judicata 7 if its merits have already been adjudicated by a state
ing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1313 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566,
573-74 (N.D. Cal. 1981); see also 21 Cong. Rec. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen.
Sherman) (the Sherman Act is intended to supplement existing state antitrust statutes). "Although the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the exercise of the state
police power" to regulate trade restraints affecting purely intrastate commerce,
Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. Fla. L. Rev. 653, 667 (1974);
see, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 209 (1914); National
Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 130 (1905), it has failed to define the precise
constitutional limits on state antitrust regulation of interstate commerce. For a
comprehensive discussion of the constitutional limitations imposed on state regulation of antitrust violations, see generally Rubin, supra, at 667-77.
5. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26 comment c(1) (1980); see, e.g.,
Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 404-05 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813, 818 n.1 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2308 (1982); Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640
F.2d 484, 488 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); Woods Exploration &
Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1303 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1254-55
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970); Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell
Co., 327 F.2d 30, 31 (8th Cir. 1964). A plaintiff who has a claim under both federal
and state law is generally free to ignore the federal ground and litigate his state claim
in state court. Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 964 (2d Cir. 1981); La
Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 506 F.2d 339, 346 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 937 (1975); Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566, 574
(N.D. Cal. 1981); see also IA J. Moore & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice 0.160
[3.-3], at 231-32 (2d. ed. 1983).
6. This Note focuses on federal suits based on § 1 of the Sherman Act because
most state antitrust actions involve claims arising under state statutes that are similar
to § 1. See infra pt. II(B). Although some states have enacted state antitrust statutes
modeled on the Robinson-Patman Act, § 2 of the Sherman Act, and the Clayton Act,
the issue whether res judicata effect should be given to prior state judgments involving claims arising under these statutes has not arisen frequently and therefore is not
considered in this Note.
7. Although the term "res judicata" has traditionally broadly comprised two
related doctrines, claim preclusion or "true res judicata," and issue preclusion or
collateral estoppel, 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4402, at 6-7, this Note,
adhering to recent Supreme Court methodology, treats "res judicata" as distinct from
"collateral estoppel," see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). The term "res
judicata" in this Note, therefore, comprises only the claim preclusion doctrine. Under
the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes
parties or those in privity with them from relitigating the same cause of action and
any claims or defenses that were or that might have been raised in a prior suit. E.g.,
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876); 18 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 2, § 4402, at 7 (quoting Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach.,
Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535-36 (5th Cir. 1978)). Collateral estoppel, on the other hand,
only precludes further litigation of those issues actually determined in a prior suit and
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court 8 under a state statute substantively identical to the Sherman
Act. 9 A novel and more problematic issue is whether the res judicata
doctrine should preclude a plaintiff from instituting a Sherman Act

necessary to the earlier judgment. E.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
326 n.5 (1979); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876). Although the
distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel is only one of degree, see 18
C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4402, at 10, the availability of res judicata as
a potential defense is essential in situations in which the doctrine of collateral
estoppel may be inapplicable in the exclusive jurisdiction context, as, for example,
when no findings of fact were made in the prior state action. See, e.g., Cream Top
Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 362-63 (6th Cir. 1967) (dismissal on the
merits with prejudice in prior state action); 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2,
§ 4470, at 687 n.32 (settlement of prior state action by consent decree); Note, The
CollateralEstoppel Effect of Prior State Court Findings!in Cases Within Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1284-85 (1978) (state court judge
expresses his findings merely as a legal conclusion or a jury returns only a general
verdict) [hereinafter cited as Prior State Court Findings]; Note, Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction: The Effect of State Court Findings, 8 Stan. L. Rev. 439, 446 & n.35
(1956) (same) [hereinafter cited as Exclusive Jurisdiction].
The traditional doctrine of res judicata is designed to end needless and repetitive
litigation. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938). Suggested reasons for this
policy include fairness to the defendant, sound judicial administration, and the
elimination of unnecessary costs on opposing parties and an overburdened judicial
system. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980). Both res judicata and
collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore must be pleaded and proved. 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 2, § 4405, at 34-35. Generally, res judicata applies only if a prior suit involved:
1) a final, valid judgment on the merits, 2) between the same parties, 3) of the same
cause of action. Nash County Bd. of Edue. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027, 1029
(E.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981):
1B J. Moore & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice T,0.405 [1], at 624 (2d ed, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as J. Moore]. This Note focuses on the identity of claims requirement. It therefore is assumed in the analysis that the remaining requirements have
been satisfied. The issue whether a federal court hearing an exclusive federal claim
should give preclusive effect to a prior state court determination under the doctrine
of collateral estoppel is beyond the scope of this Note. For a detailed discussion, see
generally PriorState Court Findings, supra, passim.
8. This Note addresses the issue of the res judicata effect of a prior state court
judgment of a state antitrust claim in a subsequent federal suit. The issue whether to
give res judicata effect to a prior suit in federal court involving a state antitrust claim
based on diversity or pendent jurisdiction does not require an analysis of exclusive
federal court jurisdiction over the federal antitrust laws. For cases involving these
issues, see infra notes 95, 120-21.
9. 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4470, at 675; see Nash County Bd.
of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (E.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d
484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); cf. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127,
127-28 (1979) (whether federal bankruptcy court should give res judicata effect to
prior state court judgment); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 668 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (whether state court judgment should be given preclusive
effect in a subsequent federal action involving a lob-5 claim).
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suit if he could have asserted a substantively identical state antitrust
claim in a prior state court action involving non-antitrust claims.' 0
Most federal courts have refused to give res judicata effect to a prior
state suit and thereby bar a subsequent federal antitrust action involving the same operative facts.' While not rejecting the applicability of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 2 these courts have reasoned, in
conclusory fashion, that a state action by definition can never be the
same cause of action for res judicata purposes as a federal antitrust suit3
simply because of the existence of exclusive federal jurisdiction.'
These decisions may be predicated on the objectives underlying exclusive federal court jurisdiction over federal antitrust claims: 14 promot10. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083,
1090-92 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated, reh'g granted, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 65,214
(7th Cir. Jan. 25, 1983), order grantingreh'g vacated, No. 81-2671, slip op. (7th Cir.
May 11, 1983). See infra note 68.
11. See Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813, 818 n.1 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2308 (1982); Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 984-85 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park
Dist., 583 F.2d 378, 379 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090
(1979); Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363-64 (6th Cir.
1967); International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 417-19 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222
F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); New Eng.
Liquor Sales Co. v. General Beverage Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,798, at
71,934-35 (D. Mass. 1982); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Automotive Serv. Councils
of Del., Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,958, at 75,961 (D. Del. 1981); see also
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26 comment c(1), illustration 2 (1980); Prior
State Court Findings,supra note 7, at 1292 & n.59; cf. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co.,
437 U.S. 655, 674-76 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Securities Exchange Act of
1934 context; not appropriate to accord res judicata effect to state court determination of a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts); Fowler Mfg.
Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1969) (state court action under state
unfair practices statute did not preclude Robinson-Patman claim, but precluded
Sherman and Clayton 'Act claims in subsequent federal action), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1012 (1970).
12. See, e.g., Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 362-63 (6th
Cir. 1967); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Automotive Serv. Councils of Del., Inc.,
1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) f 63,958, at 75,961 (D. Del. 1981). For a discussion of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, see supra note 7.
13. See, e.g., Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 984-85 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980), Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 583 F.2d
378, 379 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Cream
Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1967); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Automotive Serv. Councils of Del., Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,958, at 75,961 (D. Del. 1981).
14. See Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 984 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that state
court could not award federal antitrust damages), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078
(1980); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.) (stating that
uniform and efficient administration of federal antitrust laws could only be accomplished by the federal courts), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); cf. Will v. Calvert
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ing uniform interpretation of federal law 15 and assuring a plaintiff the
advantages of both a federal forum, which include the expertise of
federal judges, 16 the availability of jury trials 17 and liberal discovery
rules, "8' and an automatic right to treble damages.' 9 Nevertheless, in
light of the prevalence of state antitrust statutes that are substantively
identical to section one of the Sherman Act, 20 and the existence of state
antitrust enforcement mechanisms, 2' application of which would not
frustrate the original goals behind a grant of exclusive federal court
jurisdiction, 22 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has applied
23
the res judicata doctrine to bar a subsequent Sherman Act suit.

Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 670 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
exclusive federal jurisdiction "evinces a legislative desire for the uniform determination of [federal] claims by tribunals expert in the administration of federal laws and
sensitive to the national concerns underlying them").
15. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); Exclusive Jurisdiction,supra note 7, at 449.
16. See 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4470, at 676; Note, Res
Judicata:Exclusive FederalJurisdictionand the Effect of PriorState-Court Determinations, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1360, 1366, 1383 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Res Judicata
Effect].
17. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027, 1031-32
(E.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981);
18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4470, at 676; Res Judicata Effect, supra
note 16, at 1383 n.85.
18. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 675 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4470, at 676; see Res JudicataEffect,
supra note 16, at 1383 & n.85.
19. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027, 1031
(E.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
20. See Miles, Current Trends In State Antitrust Enforcement, 47 Antitrust L.J.
1343, 1346 (1979); Project, Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement: The Problems
With Putting New Wine In Old Wine Skins, 4 J. Corp. L. 547, 618 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement]. For a compilation of the official
texts of state antitrust statutes, see 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 30,000, at 35,01140,506 (1982).
21. This term comprises 1) the ability of the state judiciary to administer state
antitrust law uniformly; and 2) the state rules of civil procedure, particularly the
rules providing for discovery and a right to a jury trial. See Nash County Bd. of
Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027, 1031-32 (E.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d
484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
22. See id. at 1031-32 (state antitrust mechanisms "fulfilled" the goals underlying
a grant of exclusive federal court jurisdiction over the federal antitrust laws).
23. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 486, 497 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); see also Classen v. Weller, 516 F. Supp.
1243, 1244-45 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (federal court stayed its own proceeding pending
state court adjudication of state antitrust claim which may have been "dispositive" of
federal antitrust claim); see supra notes 68-74 (discussion of Alarrese v. American
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated, reh'g
granted, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 65,214 (7th Cir. Jan. 25, 1983), ordergranting
reh'g vacated, No. 81-2671, slip op. (7th Cir. May 11, 1983)).
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This Note concludes that federal courts should not refuse to apply
res judicata to bar a Sherman Act suit simply because of their exclusive
jurisdiction over the federal antitrust laws. 24 An exception to the
general rule of finality of judgments25 is unwarranted when the state

24. See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 488 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
25. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027, 1032
(E.D.N.C. 1978) ("Court should recognize exceptions to the operation of res judicata
only when the interests countervailing thereto are very strong indeed"), aff'd, 640
F.2d 484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); see Engelhardt v. Bell &
Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30, 35 (8th Cir. 1964) (dictum) ("The real problem in Lyons
was ... whether for policy reasons an exception should be made to the general rule
of finality of prior adjudications."). In Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394, 401 (1981), which involved successive federal antitrust suits, the Supreme
Court stated that there is " 'no principle of law or equity which sanctions the
rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata,' " id. at 401
(quoting Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946)), on the basis of "simple
justice" or "public policy." The doctrine of res judicata is " 'a rule of fundamental
and substantial justice' [and its importance] is even more compelling in view of
today's crowded dockets .... ." Id. at 401 (quoting Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad
Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917)).
"[F]ederal respect for state court judgments is [more than] a matter of judicial
grace." Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 326
(1978). It is a congressional command. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) ("The...
judicial proceedings of any court of any . . . State . . . shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage
in the courts of such State .... "). Most courts that have addressed the issue whether
to accord preclusive effect to a prior state court judgment in a subsequent federal
action based on an exclusively federal claim have ignored the mandate of this statute,
see supra note 42, possibly implying an exception to the application of § 1738 in the
exclusive federal jurisdiction context. In Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456
U.S. 461 (1982), however, the Court addressed the issue of an "implied exception" to
§ 1738 in the civil rights context over which the state and federal courts exercise
concurrent jurisdiction. The question was whether a federal court, in a Title VII
case, should give preclusive effect to a state court decision upholding a state administrative agency's rejection of an employment discrimination claim. Id. at 463. According the prior state judgment preclusive effect in the federal suit, the Court held that
an implied exception to § 1738 should not be recognized because there was "[n]othing
in the legislative history of the 1964 Act [suggesting] that Congress considered it
necessary or desirable to provide an absolute right to relitigate in federal court an
issue resolved by a state court." Id. at 473. Although Kremer involved an area of law
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the state and federal courts, "[i]t could be
argued that under [the Court's] demanding approach to the statute, there is no room
for implied exceptions in other areas of clearly exclusive jurisdiction." 18 C. Wright
& A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4470, at 68 (Supp. 1982). Professor Wright's argument is
even more compelling in the antitrust area, in which the existence of exclusive federal
court jurisdiction is not clear. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text. For a
detailed discussion of the preclusive effect to be given prior state court judgments in
Title VII suits, see generally Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The Proper Role of Res
Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1485 (1981).
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and federal antitrust claims are substantively identical26 and use of a
state's antitrust enforcement mechanisms would not undermine the
objectives of the exclusive jurisdiction grant. In such a situation, a
balance of the conflicting policies of exclusive jurisdiction and res
judicata 27 weighs in favor of giving full res judicata effect to the prior
state court judgment.
Part I of this Note examines federal courts' recent application of res
judicata to bar federal antitrust suits instituted subsequent to state
actions involving the same operative facts. Part II suggests that the
requisite identity of claims in state and federal antitrust actions for res
judicata purposes is not destroyed simply because the state action was
or could have been based on a state antitrust statute and the federal
action on the Sherman Act. Part III examines the objectives underlying a grant of exclusive jurisdiction in the antitrust context and suggests that, in certain situations, according a prior state court judgment
res judicata effect does not frustrate these goals.
I. THE RES

JUDICATA EFFECT OF

PRIOR STATE COURT JUDGMENTS

IN THE ANTITRUST CONTEXT

A. The Legacy of Lyons
The earliest case to decide whether a state action brought under a
state antitrust statute barred, under the res judicata doctrine, a subsequent federal Sherman Act suit was Straus v. American Publishers"
Association.28 The Second Circuit held that the federal antitrust
action was barred even though the federal claim was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.29 The court did not, however, analyze the substantive similarity of the claims that arose under
the state and federal antitrust statutes,3" emphasizing instead that the
state court plaintiffs initially had a choice of either a state or federal

26. See infra pt. II(B).
27. A balancing approach has been proposed by a few commentators and
adopted by at least one court. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F.
Supp. 1027, 1031-32 (E.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 878 (1981); see 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4470, at 677-78:
Res JudicataEffect, supra note 16, at 1384. But see 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 2, § 4470, at 68 (Supp. 1982) (in light of Kremer, courts may be compelled to
accord res judicata effect to prior state court judgments irrespective of a grant of
exclusive jurisdiction).
28. 201 F. 306 (2d Cir. 1912), appeal dismissed, 235 U.S. 716 (1914), questioned
in Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.) (denial of rehearing),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955).
29. 201 F. at 310.
30. See id. The relevant section of New York's antitrust statute, the Anti-Monopoly Act, ch. 690, § 1, 1899 N.Y. Laws 1514 (currently codified as amended at N.Y.
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forum in which to litigate their antitrust claim .3 1 The plaintiffs, therefore, by choosing to proceed in state court under the state antitrust
statute, were precluded from 32
presenting their antitrust claim a "second time to any other court."
This choice-of-forum rationale was rejected by the Second Circuit,
however, in Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 33 the "seminal

Gen. Bus. Law § 340 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1982)), provided: "'Every contract,
agreement, arrangement or combination whereby a monopoly ... is or may be
created, established or maintained, or whereby competition in this state ... is or
may be restrained or prevented . . . is hereby declared to be against public policy,
illegal and void." Id. The federal court, in the subsequent treble damage action, did
not consider the unavailability of such damages in the prior state action. See 201 F. at
310. The state statute authorized only imprisonment or a fine. Anti-Monopoly Act,
ch. 690, § 2, 1899 N.Y. Laws 1514 (currently codified as amended at N.Y. Gen. Bus.
Law § 341 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1982)).
31. 201 F. at 310.
32. Id.
33. 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). The procedural
issue in Lyons involved a motion by the federal defendant to stay a federal action
under the Sherman Act on the grounds that a judgment on appeal in a state suit
between the same parties would be dispositive of the federal proceeding. The state
action involved a claim for breach of contract to which the defendant had asserted
the defense of illegality under the federal antitrust laws. Id. at 185. The state court,
finding the defense without merit, awarded judgment to the plaintiff. The state court
defendant then instituted the federal antitrust suit. Id. The district court granted the
stay, Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 16 F.R.D. 384, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), but
on appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the stay, reasoning that the state court
determination would not have binding effect on the subsequent federal action. Lyons
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 185, 189-90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 825 (1955).
The Supreme C6urt, in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800 (1976), recognized that a federal action could be stayed on the grounds
of judicial economy when there was a pending state action, but only in exceptional
circumstances. Id. at 818-19, reaffirmed in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927, 938-39 (1983). Six circuits apparently recognize the discretionary power of federal courts to stay a federal proceeding in the
interests of "wise judicial administration." See Vairo, Issuing Stays in Diversity
Cases: A Cure for Growing Congestion?, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 14, 1983, at 22, col. 1. A
stay of a federal action is most compelling in routine diversity cases involving purely
state law issues, assuming a parallel action is pending in state court. Arguably, no
clear justification is presented for permitting the federal court to proceed. See Aro v.
Lichtig, 537 F. Supp. 599, 601-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Vairo, supra, at 27, col. 2. The
issuance of a stay is less compelling when federal rights are involved. If a federal
court determines that Congress intended the federal forum to be the primary forum
for the claim asserted, the court should not stay the proceedings before it. See id. at
27, col. 3. Finally, a stay of the federal proceeding is least compelling when the
federal action involves a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Because Congress intended the federal forum to be the exclusive forum for adjudicating the merits of such a claim, there is no justification warranting the issuance of a
stay. See Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 832-33 (9th Cir. 1963) (antitrust action); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189-90 (2d Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); Wellington Computer Graphics, Inc. v.
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decision" addressing the general preclusive effect of state court judgments in the antitrust area. 34 The court held that a state court determination of the merits of a defense based on the Sherman Act in a
breach of contract action should not be given collateral estoppe 35
effect, except as to findings of "evidentiary facts," ' 36 in a subsequent
Sherman Act suit brought by the state court defendant. 37 In an opinion that discredited 38 and arguably overruled Straus,39 Judge Learned

Modell, 315 F. Supp. 24, 25-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934);
Note, Stays of FederalProceedingsin Deference to ConcurrentlyPending State Court
Suits, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 684, 700 (1960). But see Classen v. Weller, 516 F. Supp.
1243, 1244-45 (N.D. Cal 1981) (staying federal antitrust action because issues presented "coincided" with issues presented in a previously filed state action and state
court decision may have been "dispositive" of federal action under res judicata or
collateral estoppel doctrines).
34. See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027, 1029-30
(E.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981);
Res Judicata Effect, supra note 16, at 1364-65; Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7,
at 440-44.
35. When a different cause of action is asserted in a subsequent suit, only the
doctrine of collateral estoppel may preclude relitigation of issues that were actually
determined in the prior suit and necessary to the earlier judgment. See supra note 7.
Because a claim and a defense are not deemed to be the same cause of action, the
assertion of a defense in a prior suit does not bar, under the doctrine of res judicata,
the assertion in a subsequent action of a claim based on the same facts. See Restatement of Judgments (Second) § 22 comments c & d (1980).
36. Judge Hand stated that collateral estoppel would apply to preclude relitigation of "constituent facts" but not of "the entire congeries of such facts, taken as a
unit." 222 F.2d at 188. This distinction between "constituent" facts and "congeries"
of facts is generally equated with the distinction between findings as to purely
"observable phenomena-termed 'evidentiary facts,' " and the application of law to
fact-issues or "ultimate facts." Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 444; see
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 515. It has been further argued
that even state court determinations of purely evidentiary facts, on occasion, should
not be given collateral estoppel effect. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S.
655, 675 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Note, Exclusive Federal CourtJurisdiction
and State Judgment Finality-The Dilemma Facing the Federal Courts, 10 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 848, 867-68 (1980) [hereinafter cited as The Dilemma Facing the
Federal Courts].
37. See 222 F.2d at 190. Judge Hand recognized that absent exclusive federal
jurisdiction over the federal antitrust claim, the state court judgment would have
been accorded full collateral estoppel effect. Id. at 188.
38. 222 F.2d at 195 (denial of rehearing).
39. See id. Although the opinion is unclear, some courts have suggested that
Lyons overruled Straus. See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d
484, 490 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); International Rys. of Cent.
Am. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 418 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921
(1967). Judge Hand could have used the choice-of-forum factor to distinguish, rather
than overrule, Straus, which based its holding almost entirely on the fact that the
plaintiff had voluntarily selected a state forum in which to litigate its antitrust
claims. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. Since the defendant in Lyons
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Hand concluded that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
courts was intended to ensure the strict and uniform administration of
the federal antitrust laws, particularly the application of the treble
damages provision. 40 Accordingly, he held that this grant to the federal courts "should be taken to imply an immunity of their decisions
4
from any prejudgment elsewhere." '
In determining the res judicata effect to be accorded a prior state
court judgment, most courts, relying on the Lyons rationale, have
assumed, simply because of exclusive federal court jurisdiction over
such actions, that a subsequent federal antitrust suit cannot be
barred. 42 Two courts readily held that res judicata would not bar the
federal suit because the state court, not adjudicating antitrust claims,

could not provide the same right to treble damages as the federal

did not have a choice of forum, the court's decision not to give preclusive effect to the
prior state determination seems equitable under the circumstances. See infra notes
62-63 and accompanying text. "[Tlhe result [of the Lyons decision] has been the
disregard of this [choice-of-forum] factor in the analysis of res judicata problems
raised when a state court has rendered a judgment, the facts of which are the basis
for a subsequent action within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts." Res
Judicata Effect, supra note 16, at 1367; see International Rys. of Cent. Am. v.
United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 417-18 (2d Cir.) (reaffirming Lyons' rejection of
choice-of-forum rationale), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967); The Dilemma Facing
the Federal Courts, supra note 37, at 867 ("Factors such as choice of forum should
have no effect on [the] determination of finality."). One court, however, in applying
res judicata to bar a federal antitrust suit, instituted subsequent to a state court
action involving the same operative facts, has predicated its decision in part on the
choice-of-forum policy. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484,
492 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981). See infra pt. I(B).
40. 222 F.2d at 189.
41. Id.
42. See Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813, 818 n.1 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 2308 (1982); Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 984-85 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park
Dist., 583 F.2d 378, 379 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090
(1979); Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1967);
International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 417-19 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967); New Eng. Liquor Sales Co. v. General
Beverage Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,798, at 71,935 (D. Mass. 1982);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Automotive Serv. Councils of Del., Inc., 1981-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 63,958, at 75,961 (D. Del. 1981); see also Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 26 comment c(1), illustration 2 (1980); Prior State Court Findings,
supra note 7, 1292 & n.59; cf. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 674-76
(1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 context: not appropriate to accord res judicata effect to state court determintion of a claim within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts); Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d
1248, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1969) (state court action under state unfair practices statute
not preclusive of Robinson-Patman claim, but preclusive of Sherman and Clayton
Act claims in subsequent federal action), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970).
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forum .43 In most of these cases, the claims asserted in state court were
based on common-law theories44 and not on state antitrust statutes.
For example, the state actions involved claims for breach of contract, 45 breach of a fiduciary duty, 46 unfair competition, 47 restraint of
trade, 48 wrongful termination of employment, 49 and the review of
state administrative agency proceedings.5 ° More recently, one court
has rejected outright the Lyons policy of absolute federal court immu-

43. See Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 984 (5th Cir. 1979) ("We have found no
decision . . .which applies [the doctrine of res judicatal to bar a second suit when
the first forum lacked the ability to provide the relief sought in the second forum.")
(footnote omitted), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Cream Top Creamery v.
Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1967) ("There seems to be some question
as to whether [res judicata] is applicable when the first forum lacks the ability to give
the relief sought in the second forum."); see also Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.) (inadequacy of state court remedies), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 825 (1955); cJ. Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (9th Cir.
1969) (state action under state unfair practices statute preclusive of claims in federal
court under Sherman and Clayton Acts but not of a claim under the RobinsonPatman Act when the state statute contained prohibitions "similar" to those made by
the Sherman and Clayton Acts but not similar to those in the Robinson-Patman Act),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970). These cases suggest that notwithstanding the
existence of exclusive federal court jurisdiction over the federal antitrust laws, res
judicata would be applicable in a situation in which the state forum could provide
the same right to treble damages as the federal forum. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v.
Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027, 1031-32 (E.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 484 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
44. See, e.g., Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d
358, 361 (6th Cir. 1967); International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Fruit Co., 373
F.2d 408, 410 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967); New Eng. Liquor Sales
Co. v. General Beverage Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1' 64,798, at 71,934-35 (D.
Mass. 1982); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Automotive Serv. Councils of Del., Inc.,
1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,958, at 75,961 (D. Del. 1981). But see Turf Paradise,
Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813, 818 & n.1 (9th Cir.) (prior state action
involved claim arising under antitrust statute), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 2308 (1982):
Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1969) (same), cert.

denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970).
45. Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 971 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.

1078 (1980).
46. International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 410 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967).
47. Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 361 (6th Cir. 1967).
48. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Automotive Serv. Councils of Del., Inc., 1981-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,958, at 75,961 (D. Del. 1981) (counterclaim in federal court
alleging Sherman Act violation not barred on basis of assertion of prior state court
claim alleging tortious interference with business and restraint of trade).
49. Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 583 F.2d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 1978)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979).
50. New Eng. Liquor Sales Co. v. General Beverage Co., 1982-2 Trade Gas.
(CCH) 64,798, at 71,935 (D. Mass. 1982).
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nity 5' by applying the doctrine of res judicata to bar a plaintiff from
instituting a Sherman Act claim in federal court following a prior
52
state court judgment.
B. Embracing Res Judicata
In an "innovative" decision, Nash County Board of Education v.
Biltmore Co.,53 the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff who had
brought a suit in state court 54 under a state antitrust statute that was
identical to the Sherman Act was barred, under the doctrine of res
judicata, from pursuing his Sherman Act claim in a subsequent federal action. 55 The court found the requisite identity of claims for res
judicata purposes even though a state statute was the basis for one
action and a federal statute for the other: 56 Both suits involved the
same price-fixing claim, 57 both statutes contained identical language
and offered an automatic right to treble damages.5 Noting that a
number of federal courts have not followed Lyons in the collateral
estoppel context, 59 the court thought it illogical that a federal antitrust

51. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
52. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); see infra notes 68-74; see also Classen v. Weller,
516 F. Supp. 1243, 1244-45 (N.D. Cal. 1981). In Classen, the court stayed a federal
antitrust action because the issues and remedies presented were "virtually identical"
to those presented in a previously filed state action. Id. at 1245. The reason for the
issuance of the stay was that the potential state court determination on the merits of a
counterclaim, based on a state antitrust statute, might have been "dispositive of the
federal claims." Id. at 1244. It is not clear, however, whether the subsequent federal
action should be precluded because of an application of res judicata or collateral
estoppel. 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4470, at 69 n.22 (Supp. 1982).
53. 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
54. In fact, the state action was not actually brought by the federal plaintiff. The
State Attorney General had filed the prior suit on behalf of a class of public school
systems, of which the plaintiff was a member. Under the identity of parties requirement of res judicata, only parties or those in privity with them are bound by a prior
judgment. Id. at 494. The court readily found that the federal plaintiff was a party to
the prior state suit, which ended in a consent decree. Id. at 493-94. A consent decree
constitutes a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes. See Rector v.
Suncrest Lumber Co., 52 F.2d 946, 948 (4th Cir. 1931).
55. 640 F.2d at 493.
56. Id. at 488.
57. Id.
58. See id. Compare Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) with
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (1981). The Nash court distinguished the case in which a
state forum could not provide the same right to treble damages as the federal forum.
640 F.2d at 490.
59. The court cited Becher v. Contoure Labs., Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 390-92 (1929)
(patent infringement) and Azalea Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Hanft, 540 F.2d 713, 715
(4th Cir. 1976) (antitrust), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 941 (1977), as two examples of
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suit could be precluded under collateral estoppel principles without
violating the purposes behind a grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction,

but could not be barred under
the doctrine of res judicata when there
60

was an identity of claims.
In addition, the court distinguished Lyons on the ground that the
federal plaintiff in that case had been compelled to assert his defense
in a forum chosen by the state court plaintiff. 6 ' If collateral estoppel
were applicable in that situation, the state court defendant would be
confronted with a "harsh dilemma. '62 He would have to elect to risk
either 1) his federal treble damage action if he asserted the defense in
the state action and the court did not uphold its validity; or 2) a state
court loss if he did not plead the defense.6 3 By contrast, the federal
plaintiff in Nash had exercised its choice of forum by electing initially
to proceed in state court,6 4 and thus could be said to have "voluntarily
waived the benefits, if any, of a federal forum." 6 5

those cases not in accord with Lyons. 640 F.2d at 491 & n.14. While it is clear that
state court determinations of pure fact may be accorded collateral estoppel effect in a
subsequent federal suit within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, see
infra note 108 and accompanying text, some courts have gone further, as Judge Hand
said they could not, and applied collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of issues
determined in a prior state proceeding. See, e.g., Vanderveer v. Erie Malleable Iron
Co., 238 F.2d 510, 511-14 (3d Cir. 1956) (patent infringement), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 937 (1957); McNally v. Esmark, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 1211, 1218-22 (N.D. Ill.
1977) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 6061 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (same), aff'd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960). But see
Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 262, 274 (7th Cir. 1981) (state court
action in which federal antitrust defenses were advanced and later withdrawn had
no preclusive effect in subsequent federal antitrust action brought by state court
defendant), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982).
Many commentators have also disagreed with the result reached in Lyons. See
Currie, supra note 25, at 347-48; lB J. Moore, supra note 7, § 0.445, at 4113-14; see
also Res Judicata Effect, supra note 16, at 1383 (application of collateral estoppel
warranted when federal plaintiff brought parallel claim initially in state court); Prior
State Court Findings, supra note 7, at 1290 (same). The court, in New York State
Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp., 591 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979), noted that the
Lyons rationale is strongest when: 1) the federal plaintiff did not choose to litigate in
the state forum, and 2) the prior state judgment turns on questions of law as
distinguished from facts and involves the interpretation of federal rather than state
law. Id. at 957.
60. 640 F.2d at 492. For a discussion of the distinctions between the two doctrines, see supra note 7.
61. 640 F.2d at 492-93.
62. Res Judicata Effect, supra note 16, at 1369 n.37; accord Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 441-42.
63. See supra note 62.
64. 640 F.2d at 493.
65. Id. at 492.
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While Nash adopted a novel, well-reasoned approach for applying
res judicata in the exclusive jurisdiction context, it was not presented
with the question whether a federal court should give res judicata
effect to a prior state action in which the plaintiff failed to, but could
66
have alleged a state antitrust claim identical to a Sherman Act claim.
Furthermore, it did not determine whether state and federal antitrust
claims could be substantively identical for res judicata purposes if the
did not provide for an automatic right to treble damstate 6 statute
7
ages.
69
68
It has been suggested, however, based on the reasoning in Nash,
that a Sherman Act suit could be barred even though a prior state
court action7 did not involve a claim arising under a state antitrust
statute. 7 ' Moreover, a state statute that could have been asserted as
the basis for an antitrust claim in the prior action need not be "identical" to its federal counterpart: For example, it may not provide for
automatic trebling of damages72 and may not be interpreted by the
state courts as rendering certain violations illegal per se. 7 3 Despite this

66. See id. at 488.
67. Id. at 490.
68. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083 (7th
Cir. 1982), vacated, reh'g granted, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 65,214 (7th Cir. Jan.
25, 1983), order granting reh'g vacated, No. 81-2671, slip op., (7th Cir. May 11,
1983). The res judicata portion of the Marrese opinion is, however, without legal
force, since the order vacating the grant of rehearing held that the court had no
jurisdicton to decide the res judicata issue.
69. The court emphasized the following factors: 1) the availability of treble
damages, although discretionary, in the state action; 2) the inconvenience to the
defendant and the judicial system caused by "piecemeal" litigation; and 3) the
inconsistency of giving preclusive effect to a state court judgment in a subsequent
federal action under the doctrine of collateral estoppel but not under the doctrine of
res judicata when there is an identity of claims. Id. at 1091-92.
70. The state court had only decided whether the plaintiff had a right under state
law to a hearing on his application for membership in a private association of
surgeons. Treister v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 78 Ill. App. 3d
746, 755, 396 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (1979).
71. 692 F.2d at 1090.
72. 692 F.2d at 1091. Under the state statute, if a plaintiff could show that a
boycott violation was "willful," the court could, in its discretion, award treble
damages. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 60-7(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983). Because
proving a "willful" conspiracy may be inherently difficult, the state provision allowing for treble damages at the discretion of the trial judge is not the same as its federal
counterpart, Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which provides an
automatic right to treble damages irrespective of the defendant's intent. Id.
73. 692 F.2d at 1090. Anticompetitive conduct constituting a group boycott
would be challenged under Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 60-3(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 19821983), which forbids conspiracies and other agreements to restrain trade "unreasonably." The difference in language between the state statute and the Sherman Act had
persuaded the state courts to hold that a group boycott could never be declared illegal
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dissimilarity, some propose that the federal suit should be precluded
because of the inconvenience of
"piecemeal litigation" to the defend74
ant and to the judicial system.

This approach would require a plaintiff wishing to sue in a state
forum on a non-antitrust claim to plead his state antitrust claim as
well even though it would not provide the relief he seeks. If the
plaintiff failed to do so, he would be barred from asserting his subsequent Sherman Act claim. Therefore, the plaintiff is in effect compelled to sue initially in a federal forum in order to obtain full relief.
This reasoning obscures the policy that plaintiffs, not judges, choose
forums. More appropriately, a court should bar a Sherman Act suit
only if a state antitrust claim that was or that could have been asserted
in a prior state action is substantively identical to the federal claim.75
II.

THE APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA: SATISFYING THE REQUIREMENT
OF IDENTITY OF ACTIONS

A. Defining the Identity of Actions Standard
The application of res judicata depends in part on the determination that there is an "identity of causes of action";7 6 the same claims
must be asserted in both suits.7 7 While no definition of a cause of
action for res judicata purposes has received universal acceptance, 78
the modern tendency is for courts to adopt a "transactional" approach.79 Under this approach, a court will bar a subsequent action if
the claim asserted is based on the same operative facts as those adjudi-

per se; it would have to be evaluated under Rule of Reason analysis. See, e.g., Blake
v. H-F Group Multiple Listing Serv., 36 Ill. App. 3d 730, 742-43, 345 N.E.2d 18, 28
(1976). Under federal law, horizontal boycotts are generally illegal per se. See, e.g.,
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959): Fashion
Originators' Guild Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941).
74. See 692 F.2d at 1092.
75. ResJudicataEffect, supra note 16, at 1375-76; see Nash County Bd. of Educ.
v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 488 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
76. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
77. E.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876); 18 C. Wright &
A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4402, at 7 (quoting Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g
& Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535-36 (5th Cir. 1978)). See supra note 7.
78. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4407, at
54-64.
79. 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4407, at 55; Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 24 comment a, at 197 (1980); see Nash County Bd. of Educ. v.
Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 487-88 & n.7 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878
(1981).
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cated in the prior suit.8 0 Consequently, the identity of claims requirement under this standard will not be defeated simply because the two
suits are based on different statutes, 81 or because a state statute or
common-law theory was the basis for one action and a federal statute
for the other.8 2
In the exclusive jurisdiction context, however, this broad definition
of a cause of action appropriately has not been accepted.8 3 A stricter

80. 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4407, at 55; see Davis v. United
States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1982); Silcox v. United Trucking
Serv., Inc., 687 F.2d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 1982); Costantini v. TWA, 681 F.2d 1199,
1201-02 & n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 570 (1982); O'Hare v. General
Marine Transp. Corp., 534 F. Supp. 120, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). A similar test is
whether the primary right and duty or wrong are the same in each case. See Ray v.
TVA, 677 F.2d 818, 821 (l1th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 788 (1983); White
v. World Fin. of Meridian, Inc., 653 F.2d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 1981); Nash County Bd.
of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 487-88 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878
(1981). Both approaches, however, reject a legal theory definition of a cause of
action, which provides that a mere change in theories of recovery, as for example,
when a different statute is pleaded as the basis for a claim in a subsequent suit,
constitutes a new cause of action. See Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 688 F.2d
166, 171-72 (3d Cir. 1982); White v. World Fin. of Meridian, Inc., 653 F.2d 147,
150 (5th Cir. 1981), see also 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4407, at 63 ("a
mere change in legal theory does not create a new cause of action").
81. 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4411, at 86-87; see, e.g., Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp.. 456 U.S. 461, 482 n.22 (1982): Davis v. United States Steel
Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1982); White v. World Fin. of Meridian, Inc.,
653 F.2d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore
Co., 640 F.2d 484, 488 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981)); Harrington v.
Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 649 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1981); Williamson v.
Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 468 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 921 (1951).
82. 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4411, at 86-87, 91-92; see, e.g.,
Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 404 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 657
F.2d 939, 945-46 (7th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 653 F.2d
1266, 1267 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Green v. ABC, 572 F.2d 628, 632 (8th Cir.
1978); Mitchell v. NBC, 553 F.2d 265, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1977); Woods Exploration &
Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1312-13 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30,
32-35 (8th Cir. 1964); Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566,
581-83 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Kirk v. First Nat'l Bank, 439 F. Supp. 1141, 1146-47 (M.D.
Ga. 1977); Davis v. Towe, 379 F. Supp. 536, 538 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd mern., 526
F.2d 588 (4th. Cir. 1975).
83. See, e.g., Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 983-85 (5th Cir. 1979) (because
an exclusive federal claim could not have been asserted in state court due to a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, res judicata not applicable to bar the subsequent federal
suit), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist.,
583 F.2d 378, 379-80 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1090 (1979); Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 841 (1975); Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th
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standard should be employed in determining whether to preclude the
assertion of a claim in a subsequent action that is not within the
jurisdiction of the first forum .84 Without such a qualification, any
state suit involving a common-law claim based on the same facts could
be dispositive of a subsequent Sherman Act suit, thereby depriving a
plaintiff of the opportunity to assert a claim over which only a federal
court can exercise jurisdiction.85
Unfortunately, most courts have adopted an overly restrictive approach by relying on the form and not the substance of the state and
federal claims. They hold that the mere existence of exclusive federal
jurisdiction precludes a federal court in a Sherman Act suit from ever
according a prior state antitrust action res judicata effect. 6 Because a
plaintiff could not have pleaded a federal antitrust claim in a prior
state action, they reason that traditional principles of res judicata are
not applicable.8 7 In addition, some courts rely implicitly, unlike many
Cir. 1967) (same). Some courts have merely concluded that the federal antitrust
claim is a "different cause of action" from a prior state claim. E.g., Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Automotive Serv. Councils, of Del., Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,958, at 75,961 (D. Del. 1981). In the cases cited supra note 76, the first action was
brought in federal court, which had jurisdiction to adjudicate both the state and
federal claims. A different situation is presented when the first forum is a state court,
which does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the Sherman Act claim. Engelhardt v.
Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30, 35 (8th Cir. 1964); 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 2, § 4412, at 93, 103.
84. See Res Judicata Effect, supra note 16, at 1375 (-If the federal and state
statutes are not equally strict, to give [res judicata] effect to the state-court judgment
would appear to undermine the federal statute."); Note, The Effect of Prior Nonfederal Proceedingson Exclusive FederalJurisdictionover Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 936, 942-43, 963 (1971) (when
"'transactional" test is applied, the state and federal claims are generally considered
identical for res judicata purposes; therefore this definition should not be adopted in
the exclusive jurisdiction context) [hereinafter cited as Nonfederal Proceedings]. But
see lB J. Moore, supra note 7, § 0.410[2], at 1182-83 n.38 (res judicata applicable
even though state and federal claims are not identical).
85. Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1078 (1980); cf. Nonfederal Proceedings,supra note 87, at 942-43 (10b-5 claim).
86. See, e.g., Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 984-85 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Part Dist., 583 F.2d
378, 379 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Cream
Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1967); International
Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 417-19 & n.18 (2d Cir.)
(dictum), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967); cf. RX Data Corp. v. Department of
Social Servs., 684 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 1982) (exclusive jurisdiction over copyright
infringement action forecloses affording prior state judgment res judicata effect);
Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 1975) (exclusive federal court jurisdiction over 10b-5 claim forecloses federal court from giving prior state common-law
action res judicata effect), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); McNally v. Esmark,
Inc., 427 F. Supp. 1211, 1218 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (same) (§ 14(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
87. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The issue whether a federal court
hearing an exclusively federal claim should give preclusive effect to a prior state court
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judgment of a related state law claim has arisen most often in lOb-5 litigation. The
overwhelming weight of authority has held that a prior state suit based on commonlaw duties is not the same cause of action for res judicata purposes as a federal suit
involving a lOb-5 claim simply because of the grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction to
the federal courts under the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp.,
392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968); Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270,
1279-80 (N.D. Ill. 1976). But see In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,015, at 91,563 (D. Kan. 1977) (prior
state common-law suit not different cause of action from 10b-5 suit merely on basis of
grant of exclusive jurisdiction); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 60 (N.D. Ohio
1959) (because common-law duty to disclose material facts was identical to defendant's duty of disclosure under a lOb-5 claim, the subsequent federal action should be
precluded under both res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrines), af-'d per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960). Although § 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 does not preempt state regulation of securities violations, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1976), the claims asserted in state court in this area are generally not substantively
identical to a lob-5 claim with respect to duties and standards of liability. State law
claims in this area typically are based on the common-law theories of fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and breach of a fiduciary duty. Nonfederal Proceedings, supra
note 84, at 937 n.9. By contrast, § 10b "is a more exacting standard and creates many
duties and liabilities unknown to the common law." Id. at 937 n.9; see Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292
F.2d 824, 833-34 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); 3 L. Loss, Securities

Regulation 1430-44 (1961); Note, Rule 10b-5: Elements of a PrivateRight of Action,
43 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 541, 542-43 (1968). In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S.
Ct. 683 (1983), the Court stated: "the antifraud provisions of the securities laws are
not coextensive with common law doctrines of fraud .... [A]n important purpose of
the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available
common law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities
industry." Id. at 691; see SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
194 (1963) (common-law doctrines ill-suited for regulation of securities industry). In
Huddleston, the Court held that the standard of proof in a 10b-5 action is a preponderance of the evidence rather than the clear and convincing standard traditionally
used in common-law civil fraud actions. 103 S.Ct. at 692. Because the burden of
proof is lighter in a lob-5 action, giving preclusive effect to the state court judgment
under either res judicata or collateral estoppel is inappropriate, see 18 C. Wright &
A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4422, at 211; Res udicata Effect, supra note 16, at 1383 &
n.85; it would appear to frustrate the congressional objective of establishing higher
standards of conduct in the securities industry. One court, in refusing to apply res
judicata in this situation, has interpreted § 28 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976),
as not foreclosing a plaintiff from obtaining the federal statutory remedies because
they are available "in addition to any other remedies existing in law or equity."
Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
Although the federal courts are also granted exclusive jurisdiction in the copyright
and patent areas, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976), the issue whether to give res judicata
effect to a prior state court judgment rarely arises. State actions in the patent field
typically involve issues of "'state" law relating to licensing agreements, assignments of
patents, and other state contractual questions, see Cooper, State Law of Patent
Exploitation, 56 Minn. L. Rev. 313, 318 (1972), and in the absence of diversity, do
not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction, 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, §
4470, at 691-92; see Cooper, supra, at 318. Recently, one court has recognized that a
prior state judgment may be accorded collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent
federal copyright infringement action. See RX Data Corp. v. Department of Social
Servs., 684 F.2d 192, 196-97 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1982) (if identical issues were presented
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other courts and several commentators 8 on the Lyons rationale 9 that
exclusive federal court jurisdiction in the antitrust context bestows
total immunity on the federal courts from prior state court judgments.90

The particular results reached under either approach were warranted because the courts were not confronted with substantively
identical state and federal antitrust claims. 9' However, when a plaintiff asserts a Sherman Act claim in federal court following an adverse
judgment in a state action based on an identical antitrust claim,
summarily refusing to accord the prior state judgment res judicata
effect appears inappropriate.9 2 In this situation, in the interests of
judicial economy 93 and fairness9 4to the defendant, absolute federal
court immunity is unwarranted.
in both forums). Nevertheless, the state claims are not generally identical to a federal
copyright infringement claim for purposes of collateral estoppel or res judicata
because of federal preemption. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. V 1981); see RX Data Corp.
v. Department of Social Servs., 684 F.2d 192, 196-98 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[N]o issue
necessary to the determination of the . . .state court judgment is identical to any
issue in this action for copyright infringement." (footnote omitted)).
88. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
89. See Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir.
1967); International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 417-18
(2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967).
90. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955).
91. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
92. See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 492-93 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); 1B J. Moore, supra note 7, § 0.41012], at
1182-83 n.38; Res Judicata Effect, supra note 16, at 1375-76.
93. Congress has expressed concern with reducing unnecessary and repetitive
antitrust litigation. A recent amendment to § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, Antitrust
Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, § 5(a), Pub. L. No. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1157
(1980) (currently codified in 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (Supp. V 1981)), sought to clarify that
the application of collateral estoppel in antitrust cases should not be foreclosed, see 15
U.S.C. § 16(a) (Supp. V 1981), because of the costs of complex and lengthy antitrust
litigation, H.R. Rep. No. 874, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2752, 2753; see Antitrust ProceduralImprovements and JurisdictionalAmendments: Hearingson H.R. 327 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-51
(1979) (testimony of Sen. Metzenbaum).
Under § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981),
judgments in an antitrust proceeding brought by the United States establishing an
antitrust violation may be used as prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation
against that defendant in a subsequent action brought by a private plaintiff. Id.
Because § 5(a) addresses the issue of different plaintiffs bringing multiple Clayton Act
suits against the same defendant, see 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (Supp. V 1981), it is unclear
whether Congress' concerns for preventing repetitive antitrust litigation would encourage the application of res judicata to bar a plaintiff from maintaining a federal
antitrust action following an adverse judgment in state court on the same claim. In
this situation, an examination of the policies behind a grant of exclusive jurisdiction
to the federal courts over the federal antitrust statutes would be compelled.
94. See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 492-93 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); ResJudicataEffect, supra note 16, at 1375-
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Thus, in determining whether there is an identity of claims, the fact
that the prior action is based on a state rather than federal antitrust
statute should not be dispositive. 95 Courts should consider, in addition
to determining whether the same operative facts were involved in
both actions, whether the state and federal claims are substantively
identical." 6 Today, it is likely that many state and federal antitrust
claims will satisfy this standard.
B. Application of the Substantive Identity Standard

The revitalization of state antitrust statutes in the last decade 97 has
resulted in an increasing number of state laws similar to their federal
counterparts." For example, several prohibit the most common per se
76; see also lB J. Moore, supra note 7, § 0.410[2], at 1182-83 n.38 (state plaintiff
could have joined state claim in federal court under doctrine of pendent jurisdiction):
18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4470, at 687 (a rule requiring a plaintiff to
advance a state claim in the jurisdiction of a federal antitrust court would serve the
needs of "judicial efficiency" and protection of the defendant).
95. See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 488 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981): cf. Green v. ABC, 572 F.2d 628, 630-32 (8th Cir.
1978) (federal antitrust claim is same cause of action for res judicata purposes as
breach of contract claim asserted in subsequent federal diversity action); Woods
Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1315 (5th
Cir. 1971) (failure to pend state antitrust claim in federal antitrust suit precluded
maintenance of subsequent state antitrust action), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047
(1972); Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30, 32-34 (8th Cir. 1964) (federal
diversity action involving state antitrust claim was res judicata as to subsequent
federal Sherman Act claim because same cause of action was asserted in both suits):
Norman Tobacco & Candy Co. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co., 295 F.2d 362, 364 (5th
Cir. 1961) (federal diversity action involving breach of contract claim was res judicata as to subsequent federal antitrust claim); Salveson v. Western States Bankcard
Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566, 582 n.18 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (failure to pend state antitrust
claim in federal antitrust suit precluded maintenance of subsequent state antitrust
action).
96. See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 488, 493 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); Res Judicata Effect, supra note 16, at 137576; cf. Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 55-60 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (because state
common-law fraud claim was identical to a lob-5 claim asserted in a subsequent
federal action, the prior state judgment should be given res judicata effect), aff'd per
curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960).
97. See Flynn, Trends in Federal Antitrust Doctrine Suggesting Future Directions for State Antitrust Enforcement, 4 J. Corp. L. 479, 480 (1979); Miles, supra
note 20, at 1345 ("Since 1970 . . . thirty-one jurisdictions . . . enacted new [antitrust] legislation."). Today, all 50 states have enacted antitrust statutes. LaRue,
Defending Antitrust Cases in the State Courts, 50 Antitrust L.J. 875, 875 (1982). See
generally 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 30,000, at 35,011-40,508 (1982) (compilation
of official texts of state antitrust statutes).
98. Many state statutes contain language identical to the Sherman Act. LaRue,
supra note 97, at 875. Compare Alaska Stat. § 45.50.562 (1980) and Del. Code Ann.
tit. 6, § 2103 (Supp. 1980) and Idaho Code § 48-101 (1977) and Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 10, § 1101 (1980) and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-801 (1978) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1
(Supp. 1981) and Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 79, § 1 (West 1976) and Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 19.86.030 (1978) with 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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violations under section one of the Sherman Act 9 and offer the same
automatic right to treble damages. 0 Furthermore, many authorize
construction of their laws in accordance with established federal antitrust precedent.' 0' In other states, judicial decisions have found fed02
eral case law "instructive" in interpreting and applying state law.
In light of these developments, it is likely that in some cases state
antitrust claims 103 may be substantively identical to section one claims
04
under the Sherman Act. 1
99. Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement. supra note 20, at 617-18. Many states
enumerate the specific activities prohibited under the statute. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code § 16,720 (West 1964); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 480-4 (1976); Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 38, § 60-3 (Smith-Hurd 1982-1983); Miss. Code Ann. § 75-21-1 (1972): N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 75-5 (1981); Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. § 15.02 (Vernon 1968).
Other states have enacted only general restraint of trade provisions, which ma'
prohibit these per se restraints. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1402 (Supp.
1982-1983); Iowa Code Ann. § 553.4 (West Supp. 1982-1983); Mo. Ann. Stat. §
416.031 (Vernon 1979); Va. Code § 59.1-9.5 (1982).
100. Compare Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16,750(a) (West Supp. 1982) and Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 35-35 (West 1981) and Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 480-13(a)(1) (1976) and
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1104 (1980) and N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340(5)
(McKinney Supp. 1982) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (1981) and Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
79, § 25 (West 1976) and W. Va. Code § 47-18-9 (1980) with 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). The Justice Department has recently proposed to limit treble damage
awards under the federal antitrust laws to per se violations. DOJ Proposes SingleDamages Remedy for Antitrust, Legal Times, Mar. 28, 1983, at 5, col. 1. If this
proposal becomes law, a plaintiff may have greater incentive to sue initially in state
court to ensure treble damage relief for violations that are subject to Rule of Reason
analysis.
101. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1412 (Supp. 1982-1983); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §
60-11 (Smith-Hurd 1982-1983); Iowa Code Ann. § 553.2 (West Supp. 1982-1983);
Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 11-202(2) (1975); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 416.141 (Vernon
1979); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-829 (1978); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:9-18 (West Supp. 19821983); Va. Code § 59.1-9.17 (1982).
102. E.g., Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 655, 194 S.E.2d 521, 530
(1973); see, e.g., Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 925,
549 P.2d 833, 835, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1976); Big Top Stores, Inc. v. Ardslev Toy
Shoppe, Ltd., 64 Misc. 2d 894, 901-04, 315 N.Y.S.2d 897, 905-08 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
103. In the situation in which a defendant asserts an antitrust counterclaim in
state court and then attempts to bring the same claim as a plaintiff in a subsequent
federal suit, the potential application of res judicata should depend on the nature of
the counterclaim. If the claim was permissive, the defendant can be said to have
exercised his choice of forum and should therefore be precluded from instituting the
federal action if the suggested standards have otherwise been satisfied. Cf. PriorState
Court Findings, supra note 7, at 1293 (precluded under collateral estoppel). By
contrast, if the counterclaim was compulsory, the defendant did not in fact have a
choice of forum, much like the state court defendant in Lyons, and should not,
therefore, be barred from maintaining his subsequent federal antitrust suit. Cf.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 n.15 (1979) (application of offensive collateral estoppel may be unfair if defendant is forced to defend in the first
forum).
104. Of course, the state and federal claims can be substantively identical even
though only the federal statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) ("in restraint of trade or
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In determining whether this substantive identity standard is satisfied, a federal court should examine whether the state antitrust statute: 1) provides the same right to relief as the Sherman Act, particularly whether an automatic right to treble damages is authorized
irrespective of the defendant's intent; 01 5 and 2) has not been construed
differently than the Sherman Act for purposes of the claim asserted
with respect to the requisite elements of proof'0 6 and whether a per se
or Rule of Reason analysis is mandated. If a state antitrust statute fails
to satisfy these requirements, then the prior state court action should
not be given res judicata effect in a Sherman Act suit. For example, if
a particular claim is subject to a per se analysis in federal court and a
Rule of Reason inquiry in the state forum, res judicata should not be
available to bar the subsequent Sherman Act suit 07 because the claims
are not substantively identical. The plaintiff has an easier burden of
proving the illegality of the defendant's conduct in the federal action
and therefore, in conformity with the goals of exclusive jurisdiction,
should not be deprived of the opportunity for a more favorable outcome in the federal forum.10
Nonetheless, a plaintiff may be precluded, under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, 0 9 from relitigating those issues of fact adjudicated
in the state forum." 0 A state court judgment therefore may, in certain
commerce among the several states"), requires a showing of an adverse impact on
interstate commerce. Nash Count), Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 488
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327
F.2d 30, 32-33 (8th Cir. 1964).
105. See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 488, 490 (4th
Cir.) (res judicata applicable because state statute authorized same right to automatic treble damages as the Sherman Act), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); Hayes
v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 984 (5th Cir. 1979) (res judicata not applicable when first
forum lacked the ability to provide relief sought in second forum), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1078 (1980); Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th
Cir. 1967) (same).
106. Res JudicataEffect, supra note 16, at 1375-76.
107. See 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4422, at 211 ("Failure to carry
a special burden of persuasion ...does not preclude a later attempt to prove the
same issue by a [lighter burden]." (footnote omitted)); accord Res Judicata Effect,
supra note 16, at 1383 n.85.
108. See Res JudicataEffect, supra note 16, at 1383 n.85; see also 18 C. Wright &
A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4422, at 211 (if burden of proof is less stringent in second
action, res judicata and collateral estoppel not applicable).
109. See supra note 7.
110. E.g., Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d
1228, 1236 n.18 (7th Cir. 1979); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184,
196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); Singer v. A. Hollander & Sons, 202
F.2d 55, 59-60 (3d Cir. 1953); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Automotive Serv.
63,958, at 75,961 (D. Del. 1981);
Councils, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors, Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499, 522-23 (E.D. Mich.
1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); Movielab,
Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam,
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circumstances, be dispositive of and, in effect, preclude adjudication
of the plaintiff's federal antitrust claim."' By contrast, if the federal
courts adopt a Rule of Reason analysis with respect to the asserted
claim and the state court engages in a per se inquiry, an exception to
the substantive identity standard should be recognized and therefore
the state court judgment should be given res judicata effect. Clearly, if
the plaintiff failed to meet the easier burden of proof in the state
court, he should not be allowed to relitigate his claim when his burden
2
is even more difficult in the federal forum."
C. Claims That Could Have Been Asserted
Under this suggested standard, the doctrine of res judicata should
also preclude a plaintiff from instituting a Sherman Act suit if, in a
prior state court suit, he could have asserted, in addition to his nonantitrust claims, a claim under a state antitrust statute that is substantively identical to section one of the Sherman Act. 113 While this result
may seem harsh, the plaintiff would be neither unduly prejudiced nor
without recourse. Moreover, from the defendant's viewpoint, asserting res judicata is necessary because collateral estoppel is a less viable
defense in this situation. Because the antitrust issues were raised for
the first time in the federal forum, a court, under this doctrine, could
only preclude relitigation of facts actually determined in the prior
4
state court action and necessary to the judgment.11

452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971); 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4470, at 680;
Res JudicataEffect, supra note 16, at 1382. Some courts may go further and preclude
under this doctrine mixed findings of fact and law or pure legal issues. Id. See supra
note 59.
111. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 196 (2d Cir.) (denying
petition for rehearing), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955).
112. See 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4422, at 211.
113. See New Eng. Liquor Sales Co. v. General Beverage Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 64,798, at 71,935 (D. Mass. 1982) (noting the lack of substantive identity
between the state and federal statutes; held that the failure to plead a state antitrust
claim in state court did not bar the subsequent Sherman Act suit).
114. The doctrine of collateral estoppel only precludes relitigation of questions
actually determined in a prior suit and necessary to the judgment. See Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876). See supra note 7. Moreover, if no specific
findings of fact were made by the state court, application of the doctrine would have
no preclusive effect on the subsequent Sherman Act claim. PriorState Court Findings, supra note 7, at 1284-85; Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 7,at 446 & n.35.
See supra note 7. By contrast, if the state and federal claims are grounded on the
same constituent facts, application of collateral estoppel to preclude the assertion of
facts actually determined in the state action, may, as a practical matter, "put an end
to the plaintiffs' [Sherman Act] claim." Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d
184, 196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); see Exclusive Jurisdiction,
supra note 7, at 443.
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Generally, because a plaintiff originally has a choice of either a
state or federal forum in which to litigate his claims,"I in the interests
of judicial economy and fairness to the defendant, he should be required to present them in one forum."" Thus, if the plaintiff brings a
common-law claim in state court, he should also allege his state
antitrust claim based on the same facts if, under the suggested standard, it is substantively identical to the Sherman Act claim. If the
plaintiff is uncertain whether the state statute has, in fact, been
construed differently than the Sherman Act for purposes of his claim,
he should nonetheless plead the antitrust claim in state court. In the
event that the federal court in the subsequent Sherman Act suit determines that the state statute has been construed differently on that
claim, the federal suit should not be barred.
Alternatively, the plaintiff could initially bring a Sherman Act
claim in federal court and, under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, 1 7 join any state law claims that he may have."" Although the
exercise of this jurisdiction is discretionary," 9 many courts have permitted the pending of state claims to federal antitrust claims. 120 Significantly, some courts have even held that a plaintiff who did not pend
his state antitrust or breach of contract claim in a federal antitrust
action was barred, under the doctrine of res judicata, from asserting
these state claims in a subsequent state suit.' 2 ' If the federal court

115. See supra note 5.
116. See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 492-93 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); cf. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394, 404 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (failure to pend
state-law claim in prior federal antitrust action precludes .assertion of claim in
subsequent state suit); Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 657 F.2d 939,
946 (7th Cir. 1981) (same); Brown v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 653 F.2d 1266,
1267 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (same); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971) (same), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972); 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4470, at 687.
117. The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction permits a federal court that has subject
matter jurisdiction over a substantial federal claim to adjudicate state law claims
arising out of "a common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
118. lB J. Moore, supra note 7, § 0.410[2], at 1183 n.38.
119. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
120. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d
1286, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); see, e.g., Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 404 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
judgment); Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420, 426-27 (3d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 913 (1973); Salveson v. Western States Bankcard
Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566, 582 n.18 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Peerless Dental Supply Co. v.
Weber Dental Mfg. Co., 299 F. Supp. 331, 335-36 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
121. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 404 (1981)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); Three J Farms, Inc. v. Plaintiffs' Steering
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refuses to exercise pendent jurisdiction because the state claims predominate, these claims may be dismissed without prejudice and left
for resolution in the state courts. 12 2 If the federal claims are without
merit, then the whole action may be dismissed and the plaintiff may
pursue his state claims in state court.12 3 Although this choice-of-forum
factor is not a traditional element of the res judicata doctrine, 21 it
nevertheless merits consideration in balancing the25competing policies
of res judicata and exclusive federal jurisdiction.
III.

BALANCING THE CONFLICTING POLICIES UNDERLYING EXCLUSIVE
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA

Assuming that the claims in a state and federal antitrust action are

substantively identical, a federal court should give res judicata effect
to a prior state court judgment unless the purposes behind the grant of
exclusive federal court jurisdiction would be undermined thereby 126

Comm., 659 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 936 (1982):
Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 657 F.2d 939, 945-47 (7th Cir. 1981):
Brown v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 653 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d
1286, 1312-16 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Salveson v.
Western States Bankcard Ass'n, 525 F. Supp. 566, 582 n.18 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Boccardo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 1053-54, 184 Cal. Rptr.
903, 914 (1982); Silver v. Queen's Hosp., 629 P.2d 1116, 1121-23 (Hawaii 1981):
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25 comment e, illustration 10 (1980): cf.
McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 249 Ga. 662, 663, 293 S.E.2d 331,
332 (1982) (plaintiff barred from asserting common-law fraud claim in state action
following federal suit under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in which state claims
could have been joined). But cf. Rennie v. Freeway Transp., 640 P.2d 704, 707 (Or.
1982) ("because of the lack of a uniform application of the rules of pendent jurisdiction and because the plaintiff had no right to have his state [fraud] claim adjudicated
in federal court, the better rule would seem to be not to apply res judicata" (emphasis
in original)).
122. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
123. Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 657 F.2d 939, 946 (7th Cir.
1981) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966)).
124. See 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4470, at 685-86.
125. See id.
126. This approach seems to have been advocated by at least two courts. See
Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30; 35 (8th Cir. 1964) (dictum) ("The
real problem in Lyons was . . . whether for policy reasons an exception should be
made to the general rule of finality of [judgments]."); Nash County Bd. of Educ. v.
Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027, 1032 (E.D.N.C. 1978) (rationale behind grant of
exclusive jurisdiction should be balanced against "strong interest in finality [of litigation] that the doctrine of res judicata is designed to promote"), af'd, 640 F.2d 484
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); see also 18 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 2, § 4470, at 689 (the "federal courts exercising exclusive jurisdiction may
often honor the preclusive effects of state court judgments ....

[A]ttention must
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through the utilization of state antitrust enforcement mechanisms.

27

Identification of those purposes, however, has been frustrated because
Congress never expressly granted the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under the federal antitrust laws. 28 Moreover,
the legislative history affords little indication that Congress intended
to vest the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction 29 or immunize

focus on the values of preclusion, [and] the reasons for making federal jurisdiction
exclusive."). But see Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 48893 (4th Cir.) (did not consider whether purposes behind exclusive federal jurisdiction
over federal antitrust laws would be undermined by according prior state court
judgment res judicata effect), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
127. See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027, 1032
(E.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
The district court concluded that the state antitrust mechanisms "fulfilled" the goals
underlying a grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Id. Theoretically, while a state
scheme may "fulfill" the congressional goals of guaranteeing a plaintiff an automatic
right to treble damages and providing for certain procedural advantages, it cannot
satisfy the objective of promoting the efficient and uniform administration of the
federal antitrust laws by "expert" judicial decision-making. The proper inquiry,
therefore, should not be whether the state mechanisms can "satisfy" the rationale
underlying a grant of exclusive federal court jurisdiciton, but rather whether their
application would subvert these objectives.
128. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) (Sherman Act) ("The several district courts of
the United States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of
sections 1 to 7 .... ") and id. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Clayton Act) ("Any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides .... ") with id. § 78aa (1976)
(Securities Exchange Act of 1934) ("The district courts of the United States
• . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter. . . and of all suits
in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
chapter .... ").
129. Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 510 n.13 ("exclusive
jurisdiction was not intended"). Several Senators had recommended that Sherman
Act suits be within the concurrent jurisdiction of the state and federal courts. See S.
Doe. No. 147, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., 21 Cong. Rec. 3150 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds);
id. at 3147 (remarks of Sen. George); id. at 2612, 3146 (remarks of Sen. Reagan). It
was thought, however, that even though a plaintiff could sue in state court to recover
actual damages under the federal statutes, a state court could not award treble
damages because they were considered a penalty. Id. at 4091 (remarks of Sen.
Culberson); id. at 3146 (remarks of Sen. Hoar). An amendment to the Sherman bill
authorizing a plaintiff to sue in "any state of competent jurisdiction" was ultimately
rejected by the Senate. Id. at 3151. Nevertheless, the statutes were subsequently
interpreted by at least two Senators as not precluding state jurisdiction over the
federal act. See id. at 4091 (remarks of Sen. Culberson) (It is a misconstruction to
assume that "sole jurisdiction to enforce a claim for damages [under] this Act is
limited to the Circuit Courts of the United States"); id. at 3148 (remarks of Sen.
Edmunds) (concurrent jurisdiction amendment was "useless" and "unnecessary").
The Supreme Court has recognized that the existence of a clear legislative purpose
to vest federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction militates against giving a prior state
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them from the effect of prior state court judgments.130 The Supreme
Court, however, has assumed without explanation that this jurisdiction exists.13 1
132
Despite the tenuous ground upon which this jurisdiction is based,
lower courts have concluded that exclusive jurisdiction in the antitrust
context: 1) promotes uniformity of federal law; 2) allows federal
judges to utilize their expertise in adjudicating claims arising under
federal statutes; 3) guarantees the availability of federal statutory
remedies; and 4) provides for a jury trial and an opportunity to
proceed under the
expansive discovery rules of the Federal Rules of
1 33
Civil Procedure.
The established body of federal antitrust precedent today 1 4 suggests that according res judicata effect to a prior state antitrust action
would not subvert the public interest in developing a uniform body of
federal law. Merely because federal courts would not be adjudicating
antitrust cases that would have otherwise appeared on their overcrowded dockets does not suggest that the existing uniformity would
be adversely affected. Furthermore, both the existence of substantively identical state and federal statutes and the increased reliance by
state court judges on federal case law in interpreting and applying
35
state antitrust laws reduce the likelihood of confusion in this area. 1 If
state court judges misconstrue federal law in adjudicating state anti-

court judgment res judicata effect. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979)
(bankruptcy discharge case). The Court in Brown held that a prior state court
judgment of the validity of a debt should not be given res judicata effect so as to
preclude the bankruptcy court from independently determining the debt's dischargeability. Id. at 138-39. The determinative factor for the Court's decision appears to be
the congressional intent, explicit in the 1970 statutory amendments, for vesting the
bankruptcy courts with exclusive jurisdiction over these questions. See id. at 138, 18
C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4470, at 679 n.12 ("Unlike many of the
exclusive jurisdiction statutes, the problem presented by this case arose from recent
legislation with a clearly articulated background and purpose."). For a comprehensive discussion of the Court's decision in Brown and the res judicata effect to be given
prior state court judgments in a federal bankruptcy case, see The Dilemma Facing
the Federal Courts, supra note 37, at 862-69.
130. Exclusive Jurisdiction,supra note 7, at 447. Rather, Congress may have only
intended to encourage injured plaintiffs to assert their federal antitrust claims in
federal court. See Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 511.
131. See, e.g., Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 451 n.6 (1943); Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440 (1920).
132. Exclusive Jurisdiction,supra note 7, at 451.
133. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
134. Rubin, supra note 4, at 732; Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement, supra
note 20, at 619; see 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law 314, at 45-51 (1978).
135. See Rubin, supra note 4, at 682; Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, supra
note 1, at 515. The Supreme Court has recently given greater deference to state court
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trust claims, these decisions will not be binding on federal court
judges 3 and therefore will not impact on the uniformity of federal
law in the federal courts. Likewise, the individual plaintiff's interest
may not be injured because the disparity of expertise between the two
judicial systems has diminished;137 state courts have, with increasing
frequency, adjudicated state antitrust claims 38 39that are identical to
claims arising under the federal antitrust laws.1
A federal court should also consider whether the particular state
system, like the federal, 4 provides for a right to a jury trial and the
use of liberal discovery rules.14 Today, many states afford these procedural advantages.14 2 Even if these benefits are not available in a
state forum, however, the application of res judicata should not be
automatically foreclosed if the above objectives behind the exclusive
jurisdiction grant would not be undermined. The plaintiff initially
had his choice-of-forum and thus could be said to have waived the

judgments of civil rights claims, over which the state and federal courts exercise
concurrent jurisdiction. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461, 476
(1982) (federal proceeding under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) was barred, under doctrine of collateral
estoppel, due to prior state court action under state discrimination laws); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980) (collateral estoppel applicable to bar § 1983 claim,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), in federal suit on basis of prior state
criminal proceeding in which same issues were fairly litigated). See supra note 25.
136. 18 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 2, § 4515, at 275-76; see Ute Indian
Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (D. Utah 1981) (federal courts not bound to
follow state court interpretations of federal law).
137. See Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 515.
138. This is true, at least with respect to antitrust suits brought by the states. See
Ashcroft, A Renewed Commitment to State Antitrust Enforcement and a State Policy
of Competition: The Missouri Experience, 46 Mo. L. Rev. 469, 470-71 (1981); Flynn,
supra note 100, at 480-81; LaRue, supra note 97, at 875.
139. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
140. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 140, 315, at 51 ("either party in a
treble damage action may demand trial by jury"); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 38 (preserves
right to jury trial afforded by the seventh amendment in actions at law); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26-37 (liberal discovery rules).
141. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027, 1031-32
(E.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981);
Res Judicata Effect, supra note 16, at 1383 n.85; cf. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co.,
437 U.S. 655, 675 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discovery rules in state court; 10b5 context).
142. See McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 3, at 3 & n.7 (2d ed.
1972) (at least 28 states have adopted the federal rules of discovery with variations).
To the extent that a private party in a state antitrust action seeks damages, he can
demand a jury trial in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Iowa R. Civ. P. 177; Ky. R. Civ.
P. 38; Mass. R. Civ. P. 38; Nev. R. Civ. P. 38; N.C. R. Civ. P. 38; N.D. R. Civ. P.
38; Ohio R. Civ. P. 38; Utah R. Civ. P. 38; W. Va. R. Civ. P. 38. The discovery rules
in many jurisdictions are virtually identical to the liberal federal rules. Compare
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procedural benefits provided by a federal forum by bringing his state
antitrust claim in state court. 143
CONCLUSION

Federal courts should not mechanically refuse to give res judicata
effect to a prior state court action based on a state antitrust statute. If
the state law claim is substantively identical to the federal claim and
use of a particular state's antitrust enforcement mechanisms would
not undermine the objectives behind the grant of exclusive federal
court jurisdiction, the state court judgment should be accorded res
judicata effect. Even though the Sherman Act suit would be precluded, the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his
antitrust claim in state court and there is no reason to believe that the
subsequent federal decision would have been more favorable. Application of res judicata in the antitrust field has become particularly
compelling today in light of the overburdened federal courts, the
prevalence of state antitrust statutes that are substantively identical to
section one of the Sherman Act, and the diminished likelihood that use
of state mechanisms will undermine the goals of exclusive federal
court jurisdiction.
Robert M. Denicola
Colo. R. Civ. P. 26-37 and Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-226-237 (1976) and Ky. R. Civ. P.
26-37 and Idaho R. Civ. P. 26-37 and Mass. R. Civ. P. 26-37 and N.C. R. Civ. P. 2637 and Ohio R. Civ. P. 26-37 and S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15-6-(26) to -(37) (1967
& Supp. 1982) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
143. Nash County Bd. of Edue. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 492-93 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); Res udicata Effect, supra note 16, at 1383; see 1B
J. Moore, supra note 7, 0.410[2], at 1182-83 n.38.

